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Abstract
Over the last two decades, the United States and the People’s Republic of China have engaged
in extensive negotiations regarding China’s protection of intellectual property rights. To date, the
countries have entered into at least four substantive agreements detailing China’s commitments
and obligations to enforce intellectual property rights (IPRs). Unfortunately, these commitments
have not led to significant improvement in China’s enforcement of rampant piracy. When, in
2001, China finally acceded to the World Trade Organization, which included the Agreement
on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), many hoped that China
would effectively finally fulfill its international obligations to protect intellectual property rights.
Indeed, the United States initially refrained from taking any overt action against China for the next
few years. The United States signaled this honeymoon period was over in April 2007 when it
filed a controversial WTO complaint against China. The complaint charges China with violating
its obligations under TRIPS to provide adequate protection for and deterrence against infringing
intellectual property rights.
THE HONEYMOON IS OVER:
THE U.S.-CHINA WTO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY COMPLAINT
Donald P. Harris*
INTRODUCTION
China's potential to become a major economic player was
the source of extensive economic and political commentary dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s.' Today, China is well on its way to ful-
filling-if it has not already fulfilled-that potential. Indeed,
since acceding to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in
2001, China has by all measures become an economic jugger-
naut. It is one of the world's fastest growing economies-cur-
rently ranked as the world's fourth largest economy, the world's
third largest trader, and the world's leading recipient of foreign
direct investment. It is poised to continue this remarkable ex-
pansion into new areas and markets. 2 China's economic trans-
formation has placed it at the center of world and U.S. atten-
tion-both wanted and unwanted. Whether it is China's eco-
nomic prowess, the large-scale recall of unsafe products, the
large trade surplus with the United States, or its controversial
* Associate Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law Temple University.
Thanks to Jeffrey Dunoff, Craig Green, David Hoffman, Edward Lee, and Peter Yu for
comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Mary Kate Bonner, Khurram Gore, and
Christopher Hobbs for outstanding research assistance. This Article was supported by
the Clifford Scott Green Chair and Research Fund in Law.
1. See, e.g., Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, China and
the United States: Present and Future, Address Before the National Council for U.S.-
China Trade (June 1, 1988), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1989 (expressing optimism for
the inevitable reform toward the market-oriented economy, and China's increased
global role through development of relations with the United States and Russia); Wil-
liam Perry, Sec'y of Defense, U.S. Strategy: Engage China, Not Contain It, Remarks at
the Washington State China Relations Council (Oct. 30, 1995), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1023 (discussing a comprehensive
U.S. approach to China's role in becoming a major world power).
2. See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Country Fact Sheet: China, World Investment Report 2005: Transnational
Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2005, availa-
ble at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite..dir/docs/wirO5_fsscn_en.pdf; see also Mar-
cia Don Harpaz, China and the WTO: New Kid on the Developing Bloc?, 71 (Hebrew Univ.
ofJerusalem Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 2-07, 2007), available at www.ssrn.com/
abstractid=961768.
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record on human rights abuses, China is highly visible.3
One area of unwanted attention, from the Chinese perspec-
tive, concerns intellectual property rights ("IPRs") protection.
Internationally, China has entered into various intellectual prop-
erty ("IP") agreements and treaties, thus demonstrating its com-
mitment to greater protection for intellectual property rights.4
These efforts have resulted in China adopting and implement-
ing strong substantive intellectual property laws. But, despite
the changes in legislation, China has failed miserably to enforce
these laws.5
China's failure to protect intellectual property rights has
prompted the United States, after many failed negotiations, to
file a WTO complaint against China. Among other things, the
complaint targets China's criminal intellectual property laws, al-
leging that these criminal laws do not provide a sufficient deter-
rent to trademark and copyright infringement, and fails to pro-
vide adequate remedies for willful trademark infringement and
copyright piracy occurring "on a commercial scale," thus violat-
ing obligations under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement ("TRIPS"). 6 The deficiencies in
China's laws stem from the high thresholds that must be reached
before criminal liability attaches. By way of example, China's
criminal copyright provision does not impose liability unless the
infringer makes, sells, or distributes more than 500 infringing
copies.7 The United States contends that these high thresholds
are inconsistent with TRIPS' required criminal penalties, which
3. Of course, these issues can also overlap, such as when counterfeit products kill
people.
4. In many instances, China did so to avert trade wars, particularly with the United
States. See infra Part II.B.4.
5. By some estimates, counterfeiters in China account for about eighty percent of
all counterfeit and pirated goods in the world. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 762 (2006).
6. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S, 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement]; see
also infra Part II.C. The complaint also claims (1) that China fails to provide protection
(or inappropriately delays protection) for certain copyrighted works, as required by
TRIPS and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
("Berne Convention") and (2) that China inappropriately allows confiscated infringing
goods to be placed back in the channels of commerce, also violating TRIPS. See infra
Part IlCI.
7. See infra Part II.A.
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were seen as a necessary component of international intellectual
property reform as a means to punish and deter the more egre-
gious acts of infringement.8
While the United States' complaint raises important legal
and social issues, the difficulty of proving the allegations in the
complaint cannot be understated. The United States must prove
that China's laws are insufficient to deter infringement or cap-
ture large-scale piracy. In other words, the United States will
have to demonstrate that "but for" the allegedly high thresholds,
China's laws would criminally penalize a substantial portion of
currently unreachable infringers. This will be a fact-intensive in-
quiry and it is not clear that the United States can marshal satis-
factory factual data to support the claim. Moreover, in light of
the vague language used in TRIPS' enforcement provisions, it is
unclear how a panel will interpret key phrases in the relevant
TRIPS provisions. A WTO panel is likely to grant China wide
discretion in implementing its TRIPS obligations.
Beyond the legal merits of the dispute, the complaint may
threaten already fragile U.S. relations with China, as evidenced
by mounting domestic dissatisfaction with China's role in the
global trading system and China's staunch resistance to U.S.
pressure to reform its legal regime. The pursuit of the com-
plaint has the potential to initiate trade wars with China, endorse
China's enforcement efforts, and cause China to retaliate with its
own protectionist policies. Such factors counsel against filing
the complaint. Despite these strong countervailing factors, nu-
merous reasons support the United States' decision.
China has reached a stage in its economic development and
a position in the global trading regime where it is appropriate to
evaluate the complaint from the perspective of China as a devel-
oped country. China has been the recipient of enormous
amounts of foreign direct investment, has enjoyed tremendous
growth in trade, and has benefited from generous currency valu-
ation. As with other major developed countries, China must
8. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE, MANUAL ON PROSECUTING INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 5-6 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter DOJ IP MANUAL], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanual/ipma2OO6.pdf ("Although civil
remedies may help compensate victimized intellectual property rights holders, criminal
sanctions are often wan'anted to punish and deter the most egregious violators: repeat
and large scale offenders, organized crime groups, and those whose criminal conduct
threatens public health and safety.").
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conform its IP regime, including enforcement, such that it com-
plies with its international obligations.
This Article has two main aims. The first is to evaluate the
principal claim in the United States' WTO complaint. As men-
tioned, in view of the discretion afforded WTO members in im-
plementing their TRIPS obligations, particularly their enforce-
ment obligations, the United States may have a difficult time pre-
vailing. The second aim is to suggest that even if the United
States does not prevail on its principal claim, it may nonetheless
"win" the dispute simply by filing the complaint, as extra-judicial
benefits may accrue that outweigh potential harms resulting
from WTO adjudication. In particular, the mushrooming U.S.
trade deficit with China, loud cries from Congress calling for
protectionist measures, persistent fears of continued unfair cur-
rency valuation practices, calls for boycotts of the 2008 Olympics
in Beijing, and numerous incidents of unsafe products being ex-
ported from China all impact the United States-China relation-
ship. The complaint thus has far reaching implications and rep-
resents an important phase in the Sino-U.S. relationship. The
United States will receive significant benefits if it can obtain con-
cessions in any of these areas by leveraging the complaint against
China's failings in these areas, regardless of the outcome of the
complaint. At the very least, the complaint signals to China that
the United States will no longer sit idly by waiting for China to
take the necessary measures and make the necessary effort to
protect U.S. intellectual property rights.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I will provide the back-
ground for the United States' intellectual property dispute with
China, tracing the detailed negotiations and agreements entered
into between the two powers and the failed efforts to induce
China to protect intellectual property rights. This Part will also
discuss China's 2001 WTO Accession and adoption of TRIPS,
wherein China agreed to implement and enforce more stringent
intellectual property laws. During this period, the United States
took a hands-off approach, allowing China time to implement its
obligations and become part of the global trading system.9 This
honeymoon period ended four years after China's accession.
China's continued lack of enforcement motivated the United
States to file its WTO complaint targeting China's ineffective in-
9. See infra Part II.
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tellectual property enforcement."
Part II offers an analysis of the complaint's merits, predict-
ing how a WTO panel might rule by interpreting key TRIPS pro-
visions and looking to other countries' criminal intellectual
property laws for guidance. As the TRIPS Agreement provides
countries with considerable flexibility in meeting their obliga-
tions and there is no international standard for evaluating effec-
tive criminal enforcement, a WTO panel may rule against the
United States, even though the United States can rely on evi-
dence of China's woeful enforcement practices. 1 The real value
of the complaint, however, may lie in extra-judicial concessions
that China may grant. In light of China's desire to appear to the
international community compliant with its international obliga-
tions, China may be willing to address U.S. concerns without
protracted litigation through the WTO dispute process, perhaps
even foregoing an appeal of the panel decision. Part III will thus
examine the reasons underlying the United States' action in fil-
ing the complaint and also the possible concessions the United
States might extract.
I. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO
THE U.S.-CHINA DISPUTE
A. The United States Push for TRIPS
To better appreciate the United States' recent action, it is
instructive to briefly explore the events leading up to the current
dispute. This begins with the United States' efforts to increase
intellectual property protection worldwide, beginning with
TRIPS. The negotiations leading to the TRIPS Agreement have
been fully detailed elsewhere.12 By most accounts, TRIPS is a
compromised bargain, a contract among its signatories, concern-
10. See infta note 79 and accompanying text.
11. See infta Part II.A.1.
12. See SUSAN K. SELL, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing
World: Crisis, Coercion, and Choice, in POWER AND IDEAS, NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST 175 (1998); see generally Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical
Assessment of the United States-China Conflict on Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 295 (1996); Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga,
15 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469 (2000); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far:
TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 681 (2006); Brett Williams, The
Influence and Lack of Influence of Principles in the Negotiation for China's Accession to the World
Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 791 (2001).
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ing the appropriate standards for international intellectual prop-
erty protection. It is perceived as a bargain that benefited all
members. Developed countries benefited from the developing
countries' new commitment to protect intellectual property
rights, while developing countries benefited by gaining access to
developed country markets, particularly for their agricultural
and textile goods.'"
A contrary perspective on the TRIPS negotiation identifies
the developed countries, particularly the United States, as coerc-
ing developing countries to agree to minimum intellectual prop-
erty standards. The United States used Section 301 and Special
301 of the U.S. Trade Act ("Section 301" and "Special 301"),14
which require the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
to identify countries that deny adequate and effective protection
to intellectual property rights and then, branding them as "pri-
ority" countries, to initiate special investigations concerning
them. This became the primary mechanism for threatening
(and taking) retaliatory trade action against foreign countries
failing to effectively protect U.S. IPRs. 15 Moreover, in securing
13. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Develop-
ment, 72 CR.-KENT L. Rsv. 385, 387, 391 (1996) (noting that developed countries
agreed to cut agricultural subsidies to provide an advantage to developing nations in
the open market in exchange for TRIPS protections).
14. Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Trr/
DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
15. Section 301 provides that when a foreign country denies rights owed to the
United States under a trade agreement, or when a foreign country is unfairly restricting
United States' foreign commerce, or if foreign countries deny adequate and effective
protection of United States' intellectual property, the United States can take various
retaliatory actions. See id. § 2(c). These actions may be taken irrespective of any breach
of an international agreement, such as TRIPS. See Ted L. McDorman, United States-Thai-
land Trade Disputes: Applying Section 301 to Cigarettes and Intellectual Property, 14 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 90, 94 (1992). Congress amended the Trade Act three times, in 1979, 1984,
and 1988, each time increasing the government's ability to retaliate against countries
engaging in "unfair" trade practices, which included not protecting intellectual prop-
erty rights. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 818 (3d ed. 1995). These actions include with-
drawing benefits the foreign country enjoys because of a trade agreement with the
United States; entering into new agreements to eliminate the offending action; or im-
posing duties or other import restrictions against goods or an economic sector of the
foreign country. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (c) (1) (2000). Because many of the "target" coun-
tries were heavily dependent on access to the United States market, they were especially
vulnerable to the U.S. threats. See SELL, supra note 12, at 182-88. The target countries
include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand. Ac-
cording to Sell, the percentage of trade conducted with the United States (as a percent-
age of total world trade) by these countries ranged from eight percent (China) to al-
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intellectual property commitments in the WTO, developed
countries were able to: (1) move intellectual property matters to
a more favorable forum (from World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization ("WIPO") to the WTO); (2) gain stronger and more
effective enforcement mechanisms (prior intellectual property
treaties contained no such enforcement provisions); and (3) use
trade mechanisms, including agriculture, textiles and tariff rate
quotas, to "swap" against stronger intellectual property protec-
tion, thus ensuring adoption of these measures.' 6 These terms
proved extremely effective in convincing most developing coun-
tries to adopt more stringent intellectual property laws through
joining the WTO. Once in the WTO, these countries were sub-
ject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which the
United States used extensively. China, not being a WTO mem-
ber, was not subject to TRIPS and the United States' coercive
Special 301 tactics against China produced mixed results.
B. China's Lack of Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
No country is more notorious and singled out for piracy and
counterfeiting practices than China. According to some esti-
mates, China is experiencing counterfeiting levels of over ninety
percent for IP-based products such as computer software, sound
recordings, and videos-with losses for intellectual property
owners estimated at US$1.4 billion annually. 7 In 2006, copy-
right piracy in China resulted in losses estimated at US$2.4 bil-
lion, and in 2007, the estimated loss increased to nearly US$3
billion.18 Eighty-one percent of pirated and counterfeit goods
seized by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Immigra-
most seventy percent (Mexico). Indeed, the United States is the biggest importer of
each of the target countries' goods (except China). Moreover, with the exceptions of
China and Mexico, none of these countries were significant trading partners for the
United States. Thus, the threats carried much weight. See id. In sum, this coercion
theory emphasizes that the developing countries did not become members of TRIPS
because of benefits accruing to them. Rather, they became members because the alter-
native left them in a worse position: without access to the United States market. See id.
16. See Doris E. Long, Copyright and the Uruguay Round Agreements: A New Era of
Protection or an Illusory Promise?, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 531, 534 n.4 (1994).
17. See DORis E. LONG & ANTHONY D'AmATO, A COURSEBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 578 (2000).
18. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIY ALLIANCE ("IIPA"), IIPA's 2008 SPE-
CIAL 301 RECOMMENDATIONS app. A, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/
2008SPEC301LOSSLEVEL.pdf (table of estimated data losses due to piracy & piracy
levels in 2006-07).
[Vol. 32:96
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tion and Customs Enforcement agencies came from China, val-
ued at US$125.6 million. 9 Beyond the sale of the counterfeit
goods, losses extend to downstream markets, such as the cine-
matic and home-video industries. 20
Experts and commentators differ regarding the reasons for
the lack of enforcement. In his seminal work, To STEAL A BOOK
Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHI-
NESE CrVILIZATION, Professor William Alford contends that the
primary reason for China's lack of enforcement is the Chinese
Communist culture, combined with the cultural roots in Con-
fucianism, which differ significantly from the U.S. Capitalist cul-
ture.21 Put in overly simplistic terms, the Chinese culture subor-
dinates individual interests to group interests, in stark contrast to
the protection of individual property rights. Therefore, protec-
tion of IPRs is not a primary concern. Corruption and the lack
of will on the part of local authorities, those most responsible for
IPR enforcement, also contribute to the lack of enforcement.
Chinese counterfeiting accounts for an estimated ten to thirty
percent of China's gross domestic product; accordingly, the eco-
nomics of counterfeiting has an impact.22 Perhaps the most ac-
curate statement to sum up the reasons for inadequate protec-
tion comes from Professors Long and D'Amato, who claim:
Lack of enforcement did not result from a single factor. In-
stead, absence of the rule of law, corruption, lack of efficient
judicial enforcement mechanisms, fiscal concerns, and local
culture and prejudices all contributed toward a global pirat-
ing problem that at times seemed insurmountable. 23
19. See SAwYuER ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE RE-
PORT FOR CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 8
(2007).
20. See id. at 12. A consulting group's study (L.EK. Consulting) for the Motion
Picture Association of America ("MPAA") estimated that 141,030 jobs are lost in the
United States due to piracy, resulting in losses of US$2.7 billion in earnings and US$422
million in tax revenue. See id.
21. See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995).
22. See ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY-THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER AND YOUR JOB 86 (2005).
Shenkar notes that "[i]n a speech to the National Association of Manufacturers,
Thomas Boam, the minister counselor, estimated that between 10 and 30 percent of
China's GDP comes from piracy and counterfeiting." See id. (quoting Thomas Boam,
Minister Counseler for Commercial Affairs, Address to the National Association of Man-
ufacturers (Mar. 23, 2003)).
23. LONG & D'AMATO, supra note 17, at 578.
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Providing a contrary perspective, Professor Aaron
Schwabach argues that the perception that intellectual property
piracy is only or primarily a problem in China (or similar devel-
oping countries) is inaccurate 4.2  Schwabach claims that "China-
bashing" pervades discourse at every level, and describes the
United States' anti-Chinese sentiment on intellectual property as
"Sinophobia. '25 He argues that the United States' widespread
perception that China flagrantly disregards intellectual property
protection more than other countries is fueled in large part by
"cost minimizing behavior by [United States'] politicians" look-
ing for convenient scapegoats:
Politicians in search of a safe, non-voting scapegoat often tar-
get foreigners .... It will always be safer for a senator from
Michigan to blame Detroit's economic woes on Japanese
carmakers (for somehow competing unfairly) than on De-
troit's carmakers for making lousy cars. Lawyers and legal
academics are not politicians, however, and have no such ex-
cuse. Indeed, it is our duty to counteract political hyperbole
with facts and reason, rather than buying into it.2 6
Schwabach argues that not only is the perception of China as a
leader in copyright piracy inaccurate, but that such piracy is
much less of a problem than piracy in developed countries. 27
Using the piracy levels per capita, he contends that China is near
the bottom of countries that affect U.S. piracy losses. At the top
of the list are developed countries with large established markets
such as France, Great Britain, and Italy. He also highlights the
uncertainties regarding piracy valuation, upon which the exces-
sively high losses are based:
The record industry might like to believe that a single
downloaded song ("Sci-Fi Wasabi," by Cibo Matta) represents
a lost US$19 album sale. More realistically, it might represent
a lost US99¢ iTunes sale, although even that may be too high:
many who download music for free do so out of curiosity, and
would not listen to the song if doing so cost even a small
amount of money. These free riders benefit from the willing-
24. See generally Aaron Schwabach, Intellectual Property Piracy: Perception and Reality in
China, the United States, and Elsewhere, 2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 65 (2008).
25. See id. at 65-66.
26. Id. at 66.
27. See id. at 69-70 (noting that piracy in developed countries is less visible because
it is online).
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ness of someone, somewhere, to pay for the song and of
someone (possibly not the same person) to make it available
for download, but as the downloaders would not otherwise
have bought the song, they do no direct economic harm.28
In sum, he highlights the rhetoric, questions the claims regard-
ing valuation and the amount of losses, and attacks the reliability
of information concerning the amount of digital piracy that ac-
tually occurs, even while conceding that such information is dif-
ficult to obtain.29
To be sure, Schwabach raises significant concerns. How-
ever, he relies too heavily on per capita statistics and does not
fully take into account China's enormous population. China's
sheer size, with over one billion people, will undoubtedly make
any evaluation based on per capita piracy more favorable to
China, placing it at or near the bottom. Not surprisingly, India
is also at the bottom. As would be expected, the leading piracy
countries per capita are developed countries with comparatively
low populations. Thus, France, Great Britain, and Italy-all with
less than sixty million people-top the chart on a per capita ba-
sis.
Schwabach may also underplay the direct economic harm
caused by downloading. While he is on firm ground arguing
that such economic data is often inaccurate and that some peo-
ple certainly will download out of curiosity, there is no question
that sales are lost and that the harm is substantial.
The truth of China's lack of intellectual property enforce-
ment lies between both accounts; though, it seems more likely
that it lies closer to the account of widespread piracy and signifi-
cant harm to the U.S. economy and other interests.
28. Id. at 71. Schwabach makes the same argument regarding DVD piracy:
Many who might have been willing to pay 60 cents for a pirated DVD of the
mind-numbingly awful conclusion to the Pirates of the Caribbean trilogy would
have been unwilling to pay US$22 for a licensed copy, or US$11 per person to
see the movie in a theater-or would have demanded their money back if they
had.
Id. at 72 (internal citations omitted).
29. See id.
2008]
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C. U.S. Efforts to Secure From China Stronger IPRs
Protection and Enforcement
1. The 1992 Agreement
China was a constant target of Special 301 actions.
China's lack of pre-TRIPS enforcement moved the United States
to threaten retaliation by designating China as a "Priority For-
eign Country" under Special 301 on May 26, 1991.3' This desig-
nation empowered the USTR to act.12 As a consequence, in Jan-
uary 1992, the United States and China executed their first full
bilateral IPR agreement. 3 The 1992 Agreement required China
to: (1) adhere to certain levels of IP protection for patents, trade
secrets, computer programs and sound recordings; (2) accede to
a number of important international intellectual property trea-
ties, such as the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (then the leading international copyright
treaty); and (3) provide effective border control procedures and
remedies.34 This required China to overhaul its IP legislation.
In return, the United States agreed to terminate its Special 301
investigation and revoke China's designation as a priority for-
eign country. 5
While the 1992 Agreement resulted in changed legislation,
30. The Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") placed China
on the Priority Watch List from 1989-90 and 2005-07; the Watch List from 1992-93 and
1995; as a Priority Foreign Country in 1991, 1994, and 1996; and as part of Section 306
Monitoring from 1997-2004 and 2006. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLI-
ANCE ("IIPA"), supra note 18, app. D, at 1 (2008) (chart of countries' special 301 place-
ment), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2008/2008SPEC301 HISTORICALPLACE-
MENT.pdf.
31. See, e.g.,Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China's Enforcement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights Protection 1986-2006, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (2006).
32. See id. China was one of the first countries the United States designated .as a
priority foreign country. See id. at 234. Those countries that have the most "egregious
acts, policies, or practices" in relation to intellectual property protection and whose
"acts, policies, or practices.., have the greatest adverse impact" and that are not "enter-
ing into good faith negotiations" or "making significant progress in bilateral or multilat-
eral negotiations." See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(2007).
33. See Massey, supra note 31, at 235.
34. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and
the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Intellectual Property, United
States-PRC, arts. 1-6,Jan. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12036, 34 I.L.M. 676 (1995), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078-158780/4/4/12279.pdf [hereinafter 1992 Agree-
ment].
35. See id. art. 7.
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it did nothing to improve enforcement. 6 In some instances, the
new legislation did not go far enough. For example, while
China amended its copyright law, the law made copyright in-
fringement only a civil, not a criminal, offense. It was not until
July 1994-five days after the United States announced that it
would again designate China as a priority foreign country-that
China provided criminal penalties for copyright infringement. 7
Despite the new legislation, piracy levels still remained among
the highest in the world. Dissatisfied, the United States again
designated China a priority country under Special 301, initiated
investigations, and threatened once more to impose substantial
trade sanctions." Further exhaustive and contentious talks led
to the next major Sino-U.S. agreement, the 1995 Memorandum
of Understanding.
2. The 1995 Memorandum of Understanding
The 1995 Memorandum of Understanding was far more de-
tailed than the 1992 Agreement. Some have argued that the
1995 Agreement may have been "the most detailed bilateral
agreement on the subject of IPRs protection entered into be-
tween two governments as of its date." 9 The Agreement, among
other things, required China to reduce piracy, improve enforce-
ment, and open its markets for U.S. computer software, sound
recordings, and movies.40 Yet again, despite new promises,
China's enforcement efforts remained nonexistent or ineffec-
tive. The United States' losses continued to total billions of dol-
36. During this time, China undertook other efforts to demonstrate its commit-
ment to protect intellectual property rights. For example, China ratified the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity on January 1, 1993. See United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, 143, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992). Then, onJan. 1, 1994, China became a member
of the "Patent Cooperation Treaty." See generally Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19,
1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231(1970) [hereinafter Patent Cooperation
Treaty]. For contracting party information, see World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) home page, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.htnl.en (last visited Sept.
26, 2008).
37. See, e.g., Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARiz. L. REv. 1081, 1104-05
(1996).
38. The United States threatened US$3 billion in punitive tariffs for China's fail-
ure to enforce intellectual property. See Massey, supra note 31, at 235.
39. See, e.g., FREDERICK ABBOTT ET. AL, THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SYSTEM: COMMENTrARY AND MATERIALS 1593 (1999).
40. Massey, supra note 31, at 232 n.6.
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lars.4 1 Aggravating this situation was the realization that, unlike
with other developing countries, the United States' coercive tac-
tics against China were entirely ineffective. Abandoning its
strong-arm tactics shortly after the 1995 Agreement, 42 the Ad-
ministration focused on exerting pressure through China's
WTO accession process by extracting from China increased obli-
gations (WTO-plus obligations) as a condition of accession and
subjecting China to the WTO dispute settlement process in the
event compliance and enforcement were not forthcoming.4
D. China's Accession to the WTO
After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations, on December
11, 2001, China acceded to the WTO.44 China's accession was a
monumental event.4 5 As the world's largest economic power not
then belonging to the WTO, China's inclusion in the global
41. See id. at 235 ("Despite the 1992 agreement, U.S. firms' losses to piracy contin-
ued to escalate alarmingly, particularly in the areas of software and recordings."); see
also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 187 (DanielJ. Gervais ed., 2007) ("Notwithstanding
these two agreements, piracy remained rampant in China in the mid-1990s, and the
United States was estimated to have lost [US]$2 billion of revenues annually due to
copyright privacy.").
42. See Yu, supra note 41, at 220.
43. The United States' ability to exert pressure on China was further constrained,
as Member Countries argued that any intellectual property rights violations should be
addressed through the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), rather than unilateral ac-
tion such as Section 301 actions. The European Union ("EU") filed a complaint against
the United States claiming that the Trade Act imposed unilateral determinations and
trade sanctions within strict time limits. This does not allow compliance with the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)) which requires either agreement among the
parties to the dispute or multilateral finding before concessions can be suspended, and
the timeframe for this process exceeded the timeframe required by the U.S. Act. Re-
quest for Consultations by the European Communities, United States - Sections 301-310 of
the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/1 (Nov. 30, 1998). The Panel concluded that in light
of the Statement of Administrative Action approved by Congress in which the United
States indicated it would base Section 301 determinations on findings of the Appellate
Body, the United States would be in compliance. See generally Section 301 Panel Report,
supra note 14.
44. See generally World Trade Organization, Accession Protocol of the People's Republic of
China to the WFO, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol].
45. See Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Implement World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 Am. U. INT'L L. REV.
399, 405 (2002).
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trade organization promised to provide huge benefits to all. De-
veloped countries gained access to China's already vast and
growing market, and China was duty-bound to obey WTO rules
and commitments. In the meantime, China's economy was pre-
pared to explode as China too gained access to new export mar-
kets. China's size, double-digit economic growth rates, and
nearly unlimited reservoir of cheap labor resources left China
poised to become an economic powerhouse. Threatened by
China's political and economic potential and the expected in-
tense competition from Chinese exports, the United States and
the European Union demanded that China take on obligations
beyond those of other WIG members (WTO-plus obligations)
and also that China not be entitled to certain rights afforded
other WTO members (WIT-minus provisions).46
Developed countries' demands reflected protectionism, as
they were concerned with cheap Chinese imports. The coun-
tries reasoned that extra obligations were appropriate "to level
the playing field for their domestic industries in their home mar-
kets as well as improve their access to the Chinese market."47
This led to extensive negotiations and disputes, as China fought
against WTO-plus and WTO-minus commitments. A critical is-
sue in this fight-perhaps the critical issue-was whether China
could accede to the WTO as a developing country, taking advan-
tage of the flexibilities and benefits available to developing coun-
tries, including benefits concerning the implementation of WTO
obligations.
1. The Debate Concerning China's Developing Country Status
TRIPS grants special treatment to developing and least-de-
veloped countries. Most notably, the least-developed countries
are granted a transition period before their TRIPS obligations
are triggered.48 Also, WTO judicial bodies arguably should in-
terpret TRIPS provisions more favorably to developing countries
and provide these countries more flexibility in implementing
46. See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 5, 17; see generally Julia Ya Qin, WfO-Plus Obligations
and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the
China Accession Protocol, 37(3) J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003).
47. Harpaz, supra note 2, at 68.
48. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 65(2) (granting an extension of four years over
the default year for developing countries).
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their obligations.49 Given this grant of special treatment, a par-
ticular country's status has significant meaning.5" The WTO
does not define developing countries; rather, countries self-des-
ignate.51 In the end, the decision to self-designate is a political
question. As a counterbalance to self-designation, other WTO
members can object to a particular designation, thus denying
favorable treatment to acceding members.52 This occurred with
China. Throughout the entire accession process, China made
enormous efforts to accede as a developing country, continually
claiming its developing country status entitled it to treatment ac-
corded other developing countries." China encountered stren-
uous opposition from the European Union and the United
States, which demanded that China accede as a developed coun-
try.
From the standpoint of per capita income, China is a devel-
oping country.5 4 In every other economic sense, however, China
is a developed country, clearly distinguishable from all other de-
49. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 12, at 687 (2006); see alsoJames Thuo Gathii, The
High Stakes of WTO Reform, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1374-75 (2006) ("The DSB [Dispute
Settlement Body] favors the interests of its most powerful members through its inter-
pretive role. It does so by applying or interpreting rules of the international trading
regime in favor of developed countries while foreclosing equally plausible applications
and interpretations that are favorable to developing countries and are entirely consis-
tent with the rules of the international trading regime.").
50. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 65-67. In addition to the Dispute Settlement
mechanism, TRIPS affords developing countries special treatment as regards grace peri-
ods suspending these countries' obligations. See id. Additionally, Articles 66 and 67
impose obligations on developed countries to provide "technical assistance" to develop-
ing countries and requires that developed countries provide incentives to encourage
the transfer of necessary technology to developing countries. See id. arts. 66-67.
51. See World Trade Organization, Who Are the Developing Countries in the W'O?,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel_e/dlwho_e.htm (stating that WTO mem-
bers decide for themselves to which group they belong). But see Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, art. XI § 2, 33 I.L.M. 13, 20
(1994) (stating the WTO uses the United Nations' definition for least developed coun-
tries).
52. See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 5.
53. See id. at 10 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), China's
Status as a Contracting Party: Communication from the People's Republic of China, L/6017
(July 14, 1986)).
54. SeeJide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming the WfO's Enforcement Mechanism, 32
(Northwestern Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Series No.07-12 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=9801002 (stating that two-thirds of the world's poor live
in Brazil, China, and India, and arguing that populous developing countries' use of the
W*r'O dispute settlement mechanism can play an important role in helping least devel-
oping countries).
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veloping countries.55 China is currently the recipient of more
foreign direct investment than any other developing country
and, indeed, more than developed countries. China represents
the third largest trading nation and fourth largest economy in
the world, and is continuing to expand.56 As such, it is hard to
argue, and will become increasingly harder to argue, that China
is a developing country with interests similar to those of other
developing countries.
In the end, China was not successful in gaining unequivocal
developing country status; instead it accepted a more compro-
mised position. In some areas, China was considered a develop-
ing country. However, in other key areas, such as subsidies,
countervailing duties, and intellectual property, China acceded
as a developed country.5" China's chief negotiator summarized
the final compromise as follows:
[W]e have taken a pragmatic attitude towards the various
treatments for the developing countries as embodied in the
WTO agreements and practices .... In some important areas,
we insist on undertaking obligations in consistency with our
own development level ... . In some areas, however, where
China has already had the capability to implement obliga-
tions as all WTO Members, we deem [it] not necessary for
China to enjoy preferential treatments to the developing
countries .... 58
2. China's WTO Obligations
Not only did China fail in its attempt to accede unquali-
fiedly as a developing country, but the international commu-
nity's fear and recognition of China as a major economic power
reinforced the view that China needed to satisfy certain addi-
tional conditions before acceding to the WTO.59 These condi-
tions exceeded those of other developing-and developed-
55. See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 12 (discussing economic statistics that favored
China's categorization as a developed nation).
56. See id. at 71.
57. See id. at 9-44 (discussing in detail China's specific wro-plus and 'AITO-minus
commitments to its WTO membership).
58. See id. at 14 (quoting H.E. Vice Minister Long Yongtu, Head of the Chinese
Deleegation, Address at the Sixteenth Session of the Working Party on China (July 4,
2001), available at http://www.china-un.ch/eng/qtzz/wtothsm/t85632.htm).
59. See Accession Protocol, supra note 44 (providing specific conditions on China's
entry to the VeTO and specific country reservations to China's entry).
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countries, particularly in the area of intellectual property. For
example, China was required to immediately implement and en-
force intellectual property laws, instead of being granted the
five-year grace period granted developing countries. 61 China
was also required to provide a six year period for the protection
of data, distinct from other members' TRIPS obligations.6' Addi-
tionally, China took on WTO-plus commitments in industrial
subsidies, 62 agriculture, 63 investment,64 national treatment,65 and
gave up WTO-minus right in key areas such as anti-dumping and
countervailing duties. 66
Upon acceding to the WTO on December 11, 2001, China
was required to conduct a major overhaul of its legislative sys-
tem, resulting in significant changes in its foreign trade and in-
vestment and intellectual property regimes.67 Despite these diffi-
60. See id. pt. I, § 2(A) (2), at 2.
61. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 39. The Article does not specify a time period for
this protection. See id. This limits China's "access to cheaper, generic versions of brand
name drugs." See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 24. While China appears to be the first coun-
try accepting this TRIPS-plus obligation, since then the United States has begun to re-
quire other trading partners to undertake similar obligations. See id. (noting that U.S.
Free Trade Agreements with Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, and Bahrain
contain such a provision).
62. See Accession Protocol, supra note 44, pt. I, sec. 10(3) ("China shall eliminate all
subsidy programmes falling within the scope of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement [Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures] upon accession.").
63. See id. pt. I, § 12 ("China shall implement the provisions contained in China's
Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and, as specifically provided in
this Protocol, those of the Agreement on Agriculture. In this context, China shall not
maintain or introduce any export subsidies on agricultural products.").
64. See id. pt. I, § 7(3) ("China shall, upon accession, comply with the TRIMs
[Trade-Related Investment Measures] Agreement, without recourse to the provisions of Arti-
cle 5 of the TRIMs Agreement. China shall eliminate and cease to enforce trade and for-
eign exchange balancing requirements, local content and export or performance re-
quirements made effective through laws, regulations or other measures." (emphasis ad-
ded)).
65. See id. pt. I, § 3 ("Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, foreign
individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises shall be accorded treatment
no less favourable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises in respect of
• the procurement of inputs and goods and services ... [and] the prices and availabil-
ity of goods and services .... ").
66. See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 36; see also Accession Protocol, supra note 44, pt. I,
§ 15.
67. See ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CON-
TEMPORARY CHINA 229-30 (2005). In point of fact, many of the legislative changes to
China's intellectual property laws came before its accession to the IArrO. In answering
whether there was a difference between China's pre- and post-TRIPS regimes, Mertha
states that there was little, if any, difference. He explains that:
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culties, once China joined the WTO, many were optimistic that
enhanced and effective intellectual property enforcement efforts
would follow. These optimists argued that WTO accession
would lead to a more prosperous China (at least for some seg-
ments of Chinese society), and that the better economic condi-
tions and living conditions would in turn result in greater de-
mand for genuine products, luxury goods, and ultimately, better
IPRs enforcement.68 As we shall see, the optimism about IPRs
enforcement was misplaced.
II. THE HONEYMOON IS OVER: THE WTO COMPLAINT
Beyond establishing substantive standards, the United
States' advocacy efforts for the adoption of TRIPS was motivated
by TRIPS enforcement provisions, generally considered one of
the most important developments in international intellectual
property protection.69 Indeed, until TRIPS, no international
standard for the enforcement of intellectual property rights had
been the subject of an international treaty regime.7v In remedy-
ing this, Part III of TRIPS established detailed enforcement obli-
gations on all WTO members to, among other things, (1) create
judicial means permitting owners to enforce their rights through
private actions,71 (2) provide for criminal sanctions to deter in-
fringing conduct,72 and (3) make available border enforcement
The 1992 MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] on intellectual property
between the United States and China incorporated many of the TRIPS provi-
sions even before TRIPS came into law. And these, in turn, found their way
into China's revised IPR laws and regulations. In effect, what this means is
that China adopted TRIPS long before other WTO members did.
Id. Nevertheless, there is little question that these changes were intimately associated
with China's efforts to accede, and, indeed, that China "might still remain outside of
the WTO had it not strengthened its protection of intellectual property rights." Yu,
supra note 41, at 196.
68. See Yu, supra note 41, at 205.
69. See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43
AM. Bus. LJ. 317, 324-25 (2006). Bird continues, "TRIPS was 'without question the
grandest event in commercial diplomatic history[.]'" Id. at 325 n.48 (citing ERNEST H.
PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEwIWORLD: THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM Xi (1995)).
70. Of course, prior to TRIPS, national laws of VrrO members contained provi-
sions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights; however, these laws varied
significantly. North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), which was adopted
at about the same time as TRIPS, also contained similar enforcement provisions.
71. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 42.
72. Id. art. 61.
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measures.
73
From China's accession in 2001, through 2005, the United
States allowed China time to implement and enforce its WTO
intellectual property obligations,74 despite mounting U.S. do-
mestic pressure. Once again, China was slow to embrace its obli-
gations. Although China implemented numerous legislative
changes, enforcement was deficient. In 2005, the USTR placed
China on its Priority Watch List for inadequate intellectual prop-
erty protection.75 Additionally, in February 2006, the United
States established the China Enforcement Task Force, whose
main function was to prepare WTO cases against China.76
In an effort to demonstrate its commitment to IPRs enforce-
ment, on April 4, 2007, the Chinese Supreme People's Court
and Supreme People's Procuratorate issued ajudicial interpreta-
tion that would lower the threshold for IPRs prosecution and
increase the penalties for violations. 77 The United States consid-
ered this a good but inadequate step, because it still left room
for a "safe harbor."78  Finally, on April 10, 2007, the United
States filed a WTO complaint against China. This move was sig-
nificant as it shifted the U.S.-China dispute from unilateral at-
tempts to procure IPRs enforcement to a multilateral approach.
73. Id. art. 51.
74. See Accession Protocol, supra note 44, annex IA, pt. VI(b) (stating that the condi-
tions of China's entry to the WTO call for "enhanced IPR enforcement efforts through
the application of more effective administrative sanctions.").
75. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Spe-
cial 301 Report Finds Progress and Need for Significant Improvements: Results of
China OCR Released, China Elevated to Priority Watch List (Apr. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2005/April/Special 301_Re-
port-Finds Progress NeedforSignificantImprovements.html.
76. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TOP TO BOTTOM REVIEW, US-
CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND EN-
FORCEMENT 5, 24, (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/
ReportsPublications/2006/assetupload-file921_8938.pdf [hereinafter USTR]; see also
Harpaz, supra note 2, at 57-58. During the TRIPS Council meeting in October 2007,
countries split on enforcement, with the United States, the European Union ("EU")
and other developed countries urging TRIPS enforcement be handled through the
TRIPS Council and China and other developing countries stating that other mecha-
nisms should address enforcement. Martin Khor, Clash in TRIPS Council on IPR Enforce-
ment Issue, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.twnside.org.sg/twninfo
478.htm.
77. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: WJ'O Case Chal-
lenging Weaknesses in China's Legal Regime for Protection, Enforcement of Copyrights, Trade-
marks, U.S. FED. NEWS, Apr. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 6947235.
78. See id.
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It also introduced significant reputational costs to China's re-
fusal to comply with its WTO obligations. In short, the com-
plaint alleged that China's criminal laws (1) do not provide a
sufficient deterrent to infringement, (2) do not provide reme-
dies for trademark infringement and copyright piracy commit-
ted "on a commercial scale," (3) do not provide adequate pro-
tection for imported works awaiting approval to enter China's
market, and (4) do not mandate the disposal of confiscated
goods, instead allowing them back into commercial channels. 79
On August 21, 2007, the United States requested impanel-
ing a WTO panel to rule on its complaint."0 As required, the
United States and China discussed the complaint in hopes of ar-
riving at a mutually agreeable solution.8 ' They were unable to
do so. On September 25, 2007, the United States made its sec-
ond request for a panel. The second request resulted in the au-
tomatic establishment of a panel by the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Body on December 13, 2007.82
A. Likely Outcome of W/TO Complaint
TRIPS established minimum substantive standards for intel-
lectual property. Beyond this, TRIPS' most significant accom-
plishment was to mandate that countries enforce these stan-
dards, breaking new ground and constituting a major achieve-
ment over the Paris and Berne Conventions. In fact, the primary
thrust of the developed countries' efforts in shifting forums from
WIPO to the WTO was the potential application of the WTO's
dispute settlement system to IPRs. 3
79. See generally Requests for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr,
10, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/casese/ds362_
e.htm [hereinafter Consultations].
80. See generally Dispute Settlement, DSB Establishes a Panel on China's Protection of
IPR and a Compliance Panel to Review US Implementation in "Zeroing" Case, WT/DS362/7
(Aug. 21, 2007).
81. See Steven R. Weisman, China Talks Don't Resolve Major Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2007, at C1 (describing talks between the United States and China as part of the
larger Strategic Economic Dialogue and their failure to resolve major issues in the Sino-
U.S. relationship).
82. See generally Consultations, supra note 79. Japan, Mexico, The European Com-
munities, and Argentina all reserved their third party rights. On the establishment of
the panel, it generally takes six months for a report to be issued.
83. These international enforcement standards were a first in international intel-
lectual property protection. Indeed, until TRIPS, no international standard for the en-
2008]
116 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNVAL
But, while achieving harmonization with respect to the sub-
stantive standards was difficult, achieving harmonization with re-
spect to the enforcement provisions was more so. Members re-
jected certain proposals such as universal recognition and execu-
tion of court judgments, because members realized that specific
enforcement obligations would work only in "a relatively 'ho-
mogenous' environment."84 TRIPS membership was far from
homogenous. Accordingly, members adopted an approach of
formulating a minimal set of procedural regulations, which was
to be guided by results-oriented criteria. For that reason, while
Part III of TRIPS establishes detailed enforcement obligations
on all WTO members, the provisions also contain vague phrases
such as "effective," "reasonable," "undue," "unwarranted," "fair
and equitable," and "not . . . unnecessarily complicated or
costly." 5 These phrases afford countries considerable latitude
in fashioning laws to meet their enforcement obligations.
In the enforcement context, TRIPS' obligatory criminal
sanctions are particularly relevant. Increased criminal sanctions
represent the latest shift in intellectual property enforcement."6
Such sanctions are unusual-even in the United States-and are
usually reserved for only the more egregious acts of infringe-
ment.87 The justifications for criminal sanctions are straightfor-
ward: deterrence and costs.
forcement of intellectual property rights had been the subject of an international treaty
regime. Of course, prior to TRIPS, national laws of WTO members contained provi-
sions on the enforcement of intellectual property rights; however, these laws varied
significantly. NAFTA, which was adopted about the same time as TRIPS also contained
similar enforcement provisions.
84. See Thomas Dreier, TRIPS and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in
FROM GATT TO TRIPs-THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 254 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996); see also,
ABBOTr ET AL., supra note 39, at 631.
85. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47(2) ("Procedures concerning the enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not be unneces-
sarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays" (em-
phasis added)).
86. See FREDERICK ABBOTT ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN IN-
TEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 608 (2007) ("There is a marked trend in the enforcement
of IPRs [intellectual property rights] toward increased criminalization of acts of in-
fringement.").
87. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 61. Even TRIPS does not provide for criminaliza-
tion of all intellectual property rights ("IPRs") infringement, instead mandating crimi-
nal penalties for copyright piracy and trademark infringement, while leaving open the
possibility for countries to criminalize other forms of IP infringement; e.g., patent and
trade secrets.
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Deterring future infringement has been "the most impor-
tant and glaring shortcoming" in intellectual property rights en-
forcement.88 While civil remedies compensate the IPRs holder,
they provide little, if any, deterrent effect.89 Criminal penalties
are thought to provide the desired deterrent effect, overcoming
the positive economic incentives to infringe.9" Criminalization
acts as a strong deterrent because, in theory, any term of impris-
onment discourages counterfeiters. In many countries, particu-
larly developing countries, prisons are unforgiving and prisoners
have few, if any, rights. In China, for example, prisons are noto-
riously harsh, and a term of imprisonment carries great social
stigma, making criminalization exceptionally effective. As
Mertha notes:
[T]he cases that do result in prosecution often result in
sentences that are considered severe. One foreign company
report stated that it was able to secure thirty-four criminal
prosecutions, with an average jail sentence of three years.
Even though such a sentence might appear somewhat mod-
est, three years in prison or in a labor camp can still act as a
considerable deterrent. It is not simply that prison condi-
tions can be terrible, but there is a tremendous social stigma
associated with a stint in prison. A prison sentence often
means losing one's livelihood, one's family, and prospects for
a decent job in the future. This is true all over Asia, but it is
particularly true in China.91
With regard to costs of enforcement, the government's re-
sponsibility to criminally prosecute shifts the cost of enforce-
ment away from private actors, saving private parties considera-
ble expense. 92
Despite the noted difficulties in achieving consensus, TRIPS
has successfully incorporated criminal law requirements into its
broader enforcement provisions. The difficulty in ensuring that
countries implement and enforce these measures, however, is
88. See MERTHA, supra note 67, at 202.
89. Fines are treated as overhead or a cost of doing business; even if fines are
increased, Mertha explains that "[b]ecause of the diffusion in the manufacturing and
distribution stages ... the merchandise on hand is always kept in small quantities in
order to ensure that fines stay low, and thus can be treated as overhead." Id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 203.
92. See ABBOTT ET At.., supra note 86, at 608; see also CHOW & LEE, supra note 5, at
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considerable. Nowhere is this more evident than in the United
States' failed efforts to ensure that China protect U.S. intellec-
tual property rights. These failed efforts have ultimately led the
United States to file its complaint against China. The complaint
represents the first opportunity for the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body to interpret TRIPS' criminal enforcement provisions.
1. Allegations in the Complaint
The United States' complaint comprises three separate
claims. First, the United States contends that under China's
criminal laws, the thresholds that subject trademark counterfeit-
ing and copyright piracy to criminal procedures and penalties
are too high.9" According to the United States, the thresholds
permit an unacceptable "safe harbor" for infringement to occur
outside the reach of criminal penalties. Second, the United
States contends that rather than disposing of counterfeit goods
that have been confiscated, Chinese Custom officials inappropri-
ately allow these counterfeit goods back into the channels of
commerce; for example, by auctioning seized goods (although
officials do remove infringing features such as fake labels). 9
The United States' third claim involves delayed copyright protec-
tion for certain goods." Here, the United States charges that
China's copyright laws deny copyright protection to imported
works that are awaiting approval to enter China's market. While
these works are awaiting approval without protection, unautho-
rized persons are allowed to manufacture and distribute unau-
thorized copies.96 The United States contends that all of these
laws violate TRIPS. This Article addresses what I contend is the
most significant claim in the United States' complaint, the
93. See generally Consultations, supra note 79.
94. See generally id.
95. See generally id. This arguably violates TRIPS national treatment principle, in
which countries must treat foreign intellectual property owners no less favorably than
domestic intellectual property owners. See also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 3.
96. See generally id. The United States also considered a fourth claim concerning
China's law regarding reproduction and distribution of infringing goods, which was
alleged to provide for prosecution of unauthorized reproduction only when the repro-
duction is accompanied by unauthorized distribution. The United States chose not to
pursue this claim, as the United States acknowledged that China's April 2007 Judicial
Interpretation may satisfactorily address this claim. That Interpretation provides that
for the purposes of Article 217 of the Criminal Code, the term "reproduction and distri-
bution" means reproduction and/or distribution. See April 2007Judicial Interpretation,
infra note 99, art. 2; Criminal Law, infra note 98.
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"threshold" claim, which directly involves TRIPS criminal intel-
lectual property provisions. This claim involves an issue of wide-
spread importance (TRIPS criminal sanctions for IPRs enforce-
ment, an issue of first impression in the WTO), will have an
enormous impact on U.S. interests (following a favorable ruling)
and involves interpretation of critical TRIPS provisions.9 7
2. TRIPS General Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement
Requirements, Articles 41 and 61
In its threshold claim, the United States charges specifically
that the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China,98 as
revised by two Supreme People's Court Interpretations," allows
97. Some support for the contention that this is the most significant claim comes
from the United States' First Submission, in which this claim is the first argued, and
more than two-thirds of the brief is devoted to arguing the merits of this claim. See U.S.
First Submission, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, 1 113, AIAT/DS362 (Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter U.S. First Submission],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/MonitoringEnforcement/
DisputeSettlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/asset uploadfile605_14436.
pdf. While I contend this is the most significant claim, I recognize that others may
contend that the market access claim is more important, as it allows for automatic pro-
tection without the need to await review and approval. This, arguably could affect many
more works. However, this claim involves less interpretative difficulties and is relatively
straightforward. Both the Berne Convention and TRIPS prohibit countries from estab-
lishing formalities for granting copyright protection. Rather, protection arises automat-
ically. See Berne Conv. art. 5(2). China's laws do not grant automatic protection to a
large category of works (those that are subject to content approval). Similarly, the
seizure and disposal of the goods claim is rather straightforward. TRIPS requires that
authorities "shall have the authority to order the destruction or disposal of infringing
goods in accordance with [certain principles]." TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 46, 59.
China's laws mandate that authorities can use seized goods for "public good" or auction
the goods. Beyond this, authorities can return goods through channels of commerce
after removing the infringing marks. In these instances, authorities do not have the
authority to dispose of the goods. It should be noted that this claim does have some
interpretative elements. For example, the VTO panel may have to decide whether the
above activities "can cause harm to the right holder" or whether the removal of the
infringing mark constitutes "alteration" justifying re-exportation. Id. art. 59.
98. See Criminal Law, arts. 213-20 (P.R.C.) (adopted by the Second Sess. of the
Fifth Nat'l People's Cong. on July 1, 1979 and revised at the Fifth Sess. of the Eighth
Nat'l People's Cong. on Mar. 14, 1997), available at http://www.com-law.net/findlaw/
crime/criminallawl.html [hereinafter Criminal Law].
99. Interpretation by the Supreme People's Ct. and the Supreme People's
Procuratorate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal
Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property (adopted at the 1331st Sess. of the Judicial
Comm. of the Supreme People's Ct. on Nov. 2, 2004 and the 28th Sess. of the Tenth
Procuratorial Comm. of the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Nov. 11, 2004 and
promulgated Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.
jsp?a no=2038&colno=121&dir=200603 [hereinafter December 2004 Judicial Inter-
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infringers to operate on a "commercial scale," therefore failing
to provide an available remedy for commercial scale trademark
counterfeiting and copyright piracy, and that the law is inade-
quate to serve as a deterrent to further infringement, thus violat-
ing TRIPS Articles 41 and 61.
Article 41(1) sets forth China's general obligations regard-
ing enforcement. That section provides, in relevant part:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as speci-
fied in this Part are available under their law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual
property fights covered by this Agreement, including expedi-
tious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which
constitute a deterrent to further infringements. 00
This section thus mandates that: (1) members make enforce-
ment procedures available and (2) remedies constitute a deter-
rent to further infringements.
China's obligations regarding criminal enforcement proce-
dures are set forth in Article 61. There, TRIPS obligates govern-
ments to establish and enforce criminal penalties for specific
types of infringement, to also serve as a deterrent. More specifi-
cally, Article 61 provides, in relevant part:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties
to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeit-
ing or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies
available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines
sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of
pretation]; Interpretation by the Supreme People's Ct. and the Supreme People's
Procuratorate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Law in Handling Criminal
Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property (II) (adopted at the 1422nd Sess. of the Judi-
cial Comm. of the Supreme People's Ct. on Apr. 4, 2007, and the 75th Sess. of the
Tenth Procuratorial Comm. of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and promulgated
on Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://aoyun.bjipo.gov.cn/web/english/public/articleDe-
tail.jsp?cmArticlelD=12090961350001 [hereinafter April 2007 Judicial Interpretation].
The Judicial Interpretations were issued to help courts interpret the new intellectual
property laws. The April 2007Judicial Interpretation closed a significant loophole that
allowed manufacturers to avoid criminal prosecution by asserting that they were in-
volved in the manufacture, not the sale, of counterfeit goods and that the criminal
threshold related only to sales. See MERTHA, supra note 67, at 209.
100. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41(1). Article 41 further requires that the
"[p]rocedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair
and equitable [and) shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly .... " Id. art.
41(2).
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penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.' ° '
3. China's Criminal Intellectual Property Laws
a. China's Criminal Trademark Laws
The United States contends that China's Criminal Trade-
mark Laws, i.e., Articles 213, 214, and 215, do not conform to
TRIPS Articles 41 and 61.02 China's Criminal Trademark Laws
describe certain acts of trademark counterfeiting that may be
subject to criminal procedures and penalties. However, all of
the criminal provisions require monetary or quantity thresholds
before triggering liability. Under Article 213, criminal proce-
dures and penalties are available for trademark infringement
only "if the circumstances are serious" or "if the circumstances
are especially serious," imposing a maximum prison sentence of
less than three years, and a prison term of from three to seven
years, respectively."0 3 Article 214 imposes a maximum prison
sentence of less than three years for trademark counterfeiting "if
the amount of sales [of commodities bearing counterfeit regis-
tered trademarks] is relatively large" and a prison sentence of
three to seven years "if the amount of sales is huge. '10 4 Under
101. Id. art. 61. While criminal penalties are not explicitly required for patent
infringement, TRIPS does allow that "[mlembers may provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property
rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale." Id.
102. It is interesting to note that China's criminal copyright provisions are not
attached to the copyright law itself. China's copyright law provides only for civil reme-
dies, including ceasing the act, making an apology, and compensation for damages,
"depending on the circumstances." Copyright Law (Revised), art. 46 (P.R.C.) (promul-
gated by the Standing Comm. Of the Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effectiveJune
1, 1991) [hereinafter Copyright Law]. Under certain "serious" circumstances the Copy-
right Administration may confiscate tools and materials used in the act of infringement.
See id. art. 47. China's civil remedies to copyright infringement further do not allow for
punitive damages. See id. art. 48 (stating that "the infringer shall compensate for the
actually [sic] injury suffered by the rights holder.").
103. See Criminal Law, supra note 98, art. 213 (emphasis added). Art. 213 states:
Using an identical trademark on the same merchandise without permission of
its registered owner shall, if the case is of a serious nature, be punished with
imprisonment or criminal detention of less than three years, with a fine, or a
separately imposed fine; for cases of a more serious nature, with imprisonment
of over three years and less than seven years, and with fine.
Id. art. 213.
104. See id. art. 214 (emphasis added). Art. 214 states:
Knowingly selling merchandise under a faked trademark with a relatively large
sales volume shall be punished with imprisonment or criminal detention of
less than three years, with a fine or a separately imposed fine; in cases involv-
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Article 215, for "cases of a serious nature," fines and a prison sen-
tence of less than three years are imposed, while "cases of a[n]
especially serious nature" mandate imprisonment of between three
and seven years.'0 5
b. China's Criminal Copyright Laws
China's Criminal Laws Articles 217 and 218 concern copy-
right infringement. These provisions similarly use indefinite lan-
guage. Under Article 217, certain acts of copyright piracy are
subject to criminal procedures and penalties if (1) the in-
fringer's purpose was to reap profits; and either (2) the amount
of illicit income is "a fairly large amount" or "when there are other
serious circumstances." The maximum sentence is less than three
years. Under Article 217, an infringer is subject to between
three and seven years if the illicit income is huge or when there
are "other particularly serious circumstances."'0' 6 Finally, Article 218
subjects an infringer to a fine and a three year prison sentence if
the infringer "gains a huge amount of illicit income. '17 Notably,
ing a large sales volume, with imprisonment of more than three years but less
than seven years, and with fine.
Id. art. 214.
105. See id. art. 215 (emphasis added). Art. 215 states:
Forging or manufacturing without authority or selling or manufacturing with-
out authority other's registered trademarks or identifications shall, for cases of
a serious nature, be punished with imprisonment or criminal detention, or
restriction for less than three years, with a fine or a separately imposed fine;
for cases of a[n] especially serious nature, with imprisonment of over three
years and less than seven years, and with fine.
Id. art. 215 (emphasis added).
106. See id. art. 217. Art. 217 states:
Whoever, for the purpose of reaping profits, has committed one of the follow-
ing acts of copyright infringement and gains a fairly large amount of illicit
income, or when there are other serious circumstances, is to be sentenced to
not more than three years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention,
and may in addition or exclusively be sentenced to a fine; when the amount of
the illicit income is huge or when there are other particularly serious circum-
stances, he is to be sentenced to not less than three years and not more than
seven years of fixed-term imprisonment and a fine: (1) copy and distribute
written, musical, movie, televised, and video works; computer software; and
other works without the permission of their copyrighters; (2) publish books
whose copyrights are exclusively owned by others;(3) duplicate and distribute
audiovisual works without the permission of their producers; (4) produce and
sell artistic works bearing fake signatures of others.
Id. art. 217.
107. See id. art. 218 (emphasis added). Art. 218 states:
Whoever, for the purpose of reaping profits, knowingly sells the duplicate
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Articles 217 and 218 impose criminal liability based on the
amount of the infringer's profits (i.e., the amount of the "illicit
income")."10
c. The December 22, 2004 and April 5, 2007
Judicial Interpretations
The Chinese Criminal Law itself does not define the terms
"serious," "especially serious," "relatively large," or "huge" as
used in the above-referenced Articles. Judicial Interpretations
remedy this. More particularly, the December 2004 Judicial In-
terpretation and the April 2007 Judicial Interpretation specifi-
cally define each of these terms. The Supreme People's Court
and the Supreme People's Procuratorate issued these Judicial In-
terpretations to help courts interpret the new intellectual prop-
erty laws. The December 2004 Judicial Interpretation defines
the terms by reference to "illegal business volume," "illegal
gains," and "illegal copies." For example, the Interpretation
states that when the amount of "illegal business volume" is more
than RMB t°9 50,000 (US$7092), or when "illegal gains" are more
than RMB 30,000 (US$4255), then such activities fall under the
definition of "the circumstances are serious," as used in Article
213.110
Similarly, for purposes of Article 214, the December 2004
Judicial Interpretation defines "relatively large" and "huge" as
sales over RMB 50,000 (US$7092) and RMB 250,000
(US$35,461), respectively, and defines "especially serious" as vol-
ume of more than RMB 250,000 or illegal gains of more than
works described in Article 217 of this Law, and gains a huge amount of illicit
income, is to be sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-term impris-
onment, criminal detention, and may in addition or exclusively be sentenced
to a fine.
Id. art. 218.
108. See id. art. 220. Article 220 of the Criminal Law provides for different stan-
dards when the crimes described in Articles 213 through 219 are committed by a "unit,"
as opposed to individuals. Article 220 provides:
When a unit commits the crimes stated in Article 213 through Article 219, it is
to be sentenced to a fine; its directly responsible person in charge and other
personnel of direct responsibility should be punished in accordance with the
stipulations respectively stated in these Articles of this section.
Id.
109. Renminbi ("RIMB") is the currency of the People's Republic of China.
110. See December 2004 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 99, art. 1.
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RMB 150,000 (US$21,277).111 "Circumstances are serious" (Arti-
cle 215) is defined as being over 20,000 copies, having illegal
business volume of more than RMB 50,000, or having illegal
gains more than RMB 30,000.112 Finally, the December 2004Ju-
dicial Interpretation defines Article 215's "circumstances of espe-
cially serious nature" as either (1) an amount more than 100,000
copies, (2) illegal business volume over RMB 250,000, or (3) ille-
gal gains over RMB 150,000.113
For criminal copyright liability under Article 217, the De-
cember 2004 Judicial Interpretation provides that "huge" means
illegal gains of more than RMB 150,000.114 Illegal gains of more
than RMB 30,000 define "the amount of illegal gains is relatively
large"; "there are other serious circumstances" is defined as ille-
gal business volume of more than RMB 50,000 or reproducing
and distributing more than 1000 illegal copies of a copyrighted
work.' 15 "There are other especially serious circumstances" in-
cludes activities where the amount of illegal business volume is
more than RMB 250,000 or the infringer reproduces and distrib-
utes more than 5000 illegal copies of a copyrighted work.11 6 Fi-
nally, under the December 2004 Judicial Interpretation, Article
218's "huge" means illegal gains of more than RMB 100,000.117
The April 2007Judicial Interpretation modified the Decem-
ber 2004 Judicial Interpretation in several important respects,
only one of which is currently relevant: the Interpretation re-
duced the unit amounts that trigger criminal copyright liability.
Instead of 1000 copies for "relatively large" and "other serious
circumstance," the April 2007Judicial Interpretation imposes lia-
bility for reproducing or distributing more than 500 copies.
And, for "huge" and "other especially serious circumstances"
(Article 217), the threshold amount is reduced from 5000 copies
to 2500 copies. 18
Both the 2004 and 2007Judicial Interpretations contain def-
initions sharing the term "illegal business volume." Where the
111. See id. arts. 1-2.
112. See id. art. 3.
113. See id.
114. See id. art. 5.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. art. 6.
118. See April 2007 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 99, art. 1.
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thresholds are defined using this term, the December 2004Judi-
cial Interpretation provides that this value ordinarily should be
calculated according to "the prices at which such products are
actually sold.""' 9 In other words, it is the price of the infringing
good as opposed to the price of the corresponding legitimate
good that determines illegal business volume. Accordingly, the
lower the price of the infringing good, the more an infringer
can sell without triggering criminal liability.
The United States attacks these laws on two fronts. On one
front, the United States contends that China does not make
available remedies for specific cases of commercial scale trade-
mark infringement and copyright piracy, consistent with TRIPS
Article 61. In other words, infringers who fall below the particu-
lar threshold, e.g., the 500 copy limit, RMB 50,000, etc., are not
subject to liability. Yet, the sale of 499 infringing copies or the
sale of goods under RMB 50,000, may very well constitute piracy
"on a commercial scale." Thus, under this safe harbor, China
does not provide for criminal procedures and penalties for an
entire class of infringers: those who structure their operations to
fit below these thresholds.12 ° Additionally, by basing calculations
on the value of the infringing product rather than the legitimate
product, counterfeiters can lower the infringing product price
until inventory is below the "legal" level; again escaping liabil-
ity.12 1
The second line of attack is that in view of the thresholds,
China's laws do not provide an effective criminal deterrent. 122
119. If the products are not sold, then the value is determined based on the label
prices; if there are no label prices, the value is determined by the "middle market
prices." See December 2004 Judicial Interpretation, supra note 99, art. 12.
120. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 61 ("Members shall provide for criminal proce-
dures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willfull trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale.").
121. The United States also argues that by basing criminal liability solely on various
thresholds that are tied to finished goods, China's criminal laws do not consider other
appropriate indicia of commercial scale piracy and counterfeiting, such as the presence
of unfinished products and fake packaging. According to the United States, "the
breadth of the term 'on a commercial scale' presumes that a wide range of considera-
tions should be probative of 'commercial scale,' but China's rigid criminal thresholds
preclude their use." See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 1 113.
122. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41 (stating that Members are required to provide
"remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements"); see also id. art. 61
("Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to
provide a deterrent .... "); see generally Consultations, supra note 79.
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By permitting excessively high infringing copy thresholds before
imposing liability and by basing damages on the infringing prod-
uct's value, the laws do not provide remedies for classes of in-
fringing conduct and thus do not provide remedies sufficient to
deter future infringers.
4. Arguments Supporting the Allegations
In support of its allegations, the United States argues that
the first sentence of TRIPS Article 61 requires China to "provide
for" criminal penalties to be applied "at least" in cases of willful
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial
scale.1 23 This requires China to provide protection for all cases
of willful commercial scale piracy and trademark counterfeiting,
not protection for some such cases. By excluding an entire class
of commercial scale infringement, China's criminal laws fail to
satisfy TRIPS.
In interpreting Article 61, the United States identifies a
number of key terms, including "willful," "trademark counter-
feiting," and "copyright piracy." However, the United States con-
cedes that none of these terms are at issue. 1 24 The United
States' argument thus hinges on interpreting "commercial
scale." The United States interprets "commercial scale" to in-
clude copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting that fall be-
low the various thresholds contained in China's criminal laws. It
is only by interpreting commercial scale in this manner that the
United States can successfully contend that China is failing to
honor its TRIPS obligations.
Relying on the ordinary meaning of the terms "commercial"
("pertaining to, or bearing on commerce," "interested in finan-
cial return," "likely to make a profit," or "regarded as a mere
matter of business") and "scale" ("relative magnitude or extent"
or "degree; proportion"), 25 the United States interprets "com-
123. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 89-91.
124. See id. 101 (stating that the United States does not claim that China's laws
fail to cover the full extent of the term "trademark counterfeiting"); id. 106 (stating
that the United States does not claim that China's laws fail to cover the full extent of the
term "copyright piracy"); id. 9 107 (stating that the United States does not claim that
any state of mind requirements in China's laws are inconsistent with China's WATO obli-
gations).
125. See id. 1 109 (citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY 451 (4th ed.
1993)).
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mercial scale" to extend both (1) to those who engage in com-
mercial activities in order to make a financial return in the mar-
ketplace, as well as (2) to those whose actions, regardless of mo-
tive or purpose, are of a sufficient extent or magnitude to qualify
as "commercial scale" in the relevant market. 126 While the
United States argues that both of these must be criminalized
under Article 61, it focuses on the first of these interpretations
and argues that China's criminal laws do not reach all infringers
who engage in commercial activities. With respect to the first set
of activities, the United States argues that "commercial scale"
should be interpreted in a way that imposes criminal liability
against any infringer who engages in commercial activity, regard-
less of the extent or magnitude of that commercial activity.1 27
Having so defined "commercial scale," the United States at-
tacks China's thresholds by noting that many Chinese infringers
structure their commercial operations to ensure that they oper-
ate below the relevant thresholds. 128 According to the United
States "[a] t any given inspection, an enterprise can ensure that it
has insufficient inventory or has insufficient recorded turnover
(by, for example, keeping no records) to meet any of China's
criminal thresholds for trademark counterfeiting or copyright
piracy. '1 2' Thus, despite being below the criminal thresholds,
these enterprises are nonetheless engaged in commercial activi-
ties and are operating on a commercial scale.
The United States demonstrates China's failings and the in-
adequacy of China's criminal laws with reference to a report pre-
pared by the China Copyright Alliance ("CCA"), a coalition of
six trade associations that represent major intellectual property
industries, including the Motion Picture Association of America,
the Recording Industry Association of America, the Association
of American Publishers, the Independent Film & Television Alli-
ance, the International Federation of the Phonographic Indus-
try, and the Art Copyright Coalition.3 ° The CCA Report, enti-
126. See id.
127. See id. ("[lit is the former activity that forms the focus of this submission.");
id. I 110. 'While the United States claims that activity that is "of a significant extent or
magnitude to qualify as commercial scale" is not an issue, it is nevertheless relevant, as it
demonstrates the United States' interpretation of Article 61 and, in turn, of China's
responsibilities.
128. See id. 114.
129. Id.
130. See id. 154 n.108.
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tled the Report on Copyright Complaints, Raids and Resulting Crimi-
nal Actions in China, purportedly covers several hundred
enforcement actions in four major Chinese cities (Beijing,
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou) over a two-year period
(January 2006-November 2007)."' During this time, both the
December 2004 Judicial Interpretation and the April 2007 Judi-
cial Interpretation were in effect.
According to the United States, the CCA Report demon-
strates that commercial enterprises adjusted their operations to
ensure that they did not run afoul of the criminal thresholds. In
2006, for example, when the criminal threshold for copyright
piracy was 1000 infringing copies, there were 633 administrative
enforcement raid cases, 521 of which involved infringing copies
of less than 1000. In other words, 82.31% of the cases fell below
the stated threshold. 11 2 In 2007, when the threshold was re-
duced to 500 infringing copies, the numbers remained the same:
of 477 cases, 396 (83.02%) fell below the threshold.133 The data
purportedly suggests that infringers adapt quickly; making cer-
tain that they keep inventory below the relevant thresholds. The
United States thus claims that the CCA Report illustrates the
weakness of China's threshold-based system. In effect, the
thresholds function as a "safe harbor" and afford businesses a
"convenient reference point for structuring their business to
minimize the likelihood that any of them could ever be associ-
ated with enough inventory or turnover to face criminal prosecu-
tion or conviction. ' 134 Importantly, in terms of Article 61's stan-
dard, the United States contends that these enforcement actions
demonstrate that infringers commit copyright piracy and trade-
mark counterfeiting on a commercial scale by engaging in com-
mercial activities in order to make a financial return, yet escap-
131. See id. 154.
132. Of the 633 cases, 521 fell between 0-999 infringing copies, forty-four cases
(6.95%) fell between 1000-2999 infringing copies, and sixty-eight cases (10.74%) were
above 3000 infringing copies. See id. 156-57.
133. Of the 477 cases, 396 (83.02%) fell between 0-499 infringing copies, thirty-
nine (8.18%) fell between 500-999 infringing copies, and forty-two (8.81%) were above
1000 infringing copies. See id. 9 158.
134. Id. The United States argues that enterprises can avoid prosecution in a num-
ber of ways, e.g., by "selling their goods by means of a catalogue that features only the
sleeves of DVD that are available for sale, keeping available inventory low, or by simply
not keeping quantified sales records-to ensure no one can prove they meet the vol-
ume and value thresholds." Id.
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ing liability. China's laws thus allegedly fail to comply with Arti-
cle 61.135
Moreover, the United States argues that not only do the
thresholds exclude whole classes of commercial scale counter-
feiting and piracy, but that the situation is exacerbated because
of "restrictive calculations" of the thresholds. For instance, for
criminal liability to attach for trademark counterfeiting, an "ille-
gal business volume" threshold of more than RMB 50,000 must
be met. The threshold is restrictively calculated because the "il-
legal business volume" is calculated based on the price of the
infringing good, rather than the legitimate good. Because the
price of the infringing product is almost always far less than the
price of the legitimate good, this calculation "adds an additional
margin of comfort" for infringers.'1 6 The United States high-
lights a news report that found that legitimate copies of "Spider
Man 2" sold at US$4.68, while pirated copies of the newer "Spi-
der Man 3" sold for US$2. At these price points, the illegal busi-
ness volume threshold for copyright piracy would not be
reached until almost 1470 pirated copies were sold.1 7 This, the
United States argues, would certainly constitute commercial
scale copyright piracy, although China's laws would shield the
counterfeiters from prosecution.1
3 8
To support its second line of attack that China's criminal
laws fail to deter future infringers, the United States again relies
on the CCA Report. The fact that more than eighty percent of
the administrative enforcement raid cases fall below the quantity
threshold illustrates that the thresholds have no deterrent effect.
Even the reduced threshold (i.e., from the 1000 infringing copy
threshold to the 500 infringing copy threshold) has no deterrent
effect, as the same percentage of copyright piracy continued af-
ter the reduced thresholds. Indeed, rather than having a deter-
rent effect, the thresholds provided "clear guideposts" to avoid
prosecution and allow counterfeiters and pirates to effectively
and quickly respond to the arbitrary thresholds.
13 9
With respect to Article 41, the United States argues that be-
cause China has failed to provide for criminal penalties and pro-
135. See id.
136. See id. 119.
137. See id. 136.
138. See id. 9 136-37.
139. See id. I 153, 159.
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cedures under Article 61 for an entire class of commercial scale
piracy and counterfeiting, China has failed to "ensure that en-
forcement procedures . . . are available" under Article 41.014
Thus, the United States' Article 41 complaint stands or falls with
Article 61. Consequently, the remainder of this discussion will
focus on Article 61.
5. China's Defenses
a. China has Wide Discretion in Implementing
its TRIPS Obligations
China will defend its laws on a number of grounds, some
general and others specific. In terms of general objections,
China will argue that it has wide discretion in implementing its
obligations, relying on TRIPS Article 1.1. That Article states
that:
Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their
law more extensive protection than is required by this Agree-
ment, provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine
the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agree-
ment within their own legal system and practice.141
Article 1 recognizes that each country, in its sovereignty, should
be afforded appropriate discretion in implementing its TRIPS
obligations. Moreover, China will underscore that during its
WTO accession it rejected efforts by the United States and
others to amend these very thresholds, indicating that such
amendments were unnecessary. Finally, China may note that
during its accession process, it steadfastly maintained that it ac-
ceded as a developing country and, as such, is entitled to wider
discretion in implementing its enforcement obligations.
b. TRIPS does not Require Special Attention be Paid to IP
China may also generally rely on the discretion contained in
Article 41. Article 41 permits a country to allocate resources for
IPRs enforcement as it deems appropriate. It provides:
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation
140. See id. 11 167-69.
141. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
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to put in place ajudicial system for the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement
of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members
to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any
obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between en-
forcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in
general. 1
42
Article 41 (5) thus does not require that China pay special atten-
tion to IPRs. Instead, it recognizes that other areas can be more
important than intellectual property. China can point to en-
forcement efforts and resources diverted to other areas such as
labor, human rights, the environment, and taxes, for example.
By placing IPRs enforcement in the broader context of its civil
and criminal legal systems, China can credibly argue that its nas-
cent intellectual property laws are, under the current situation,
adequate, even if not ideal.14 Along these lines, China will con-
tend that to suggest that it enforce intellectual property laws in
the same manner as it does its other laws is unrealistic. A more
challenging contention might be that neither China nor any
other WTO Member need protect the interests of private parties,
particularly foreign parties, with the same urgency with which it
protects its own interests.1
44
Finally, in terms of general responses, China can point to
the tremendous strides it has made in intellectual property en-
forcement. China has introduced comprehensive new legisla-
tion that exceeds TRIPS requirements and has made high pro-
file infringement arrests. Recall, China has only recently em-
braced the new phenomenon of Western-styled intellectual
property. As Stewart and Williams observe:
China has only recently begun to regard intellectual property
law as an important part of its legal infrastructure. For exam-
ple, the Patent Law was only introduced in 1984 and the Cop-
yright Law in 1990. It was also only as the WTO accession ne-
142. Id. art. 41(5) (emphasis added).
143. See Frederick M. Abbott, China in the WO 2006: "Law and its Limitations" in the
Context of TRIPS, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs 59, 72-73 (George A.
Berman & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
144. See, e.g., Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 795, 820 (2006). This, however, may run afoul of China's national treatment
obligations under TRIPS. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 3 ("Each member shall accord to the
nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property .... ").
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gotiation reached its latter stages that the Chinese govern-
ment began to accord any priority to enforcement of IP
law. 145
Prior to the United States filing the complaint, China had al-
ready taken a number of important steps to amend or adopt a
range of laws, regulations, and other measures in the intellectual
property rights area, including:
" Regulations to enhance protection for copyrighted works
on the Internet, in preparation for China's recent acces-
sion to the WIPO Internet Treaties;
• Measures to protect intellectual property rights at trade
fairs;
" New patent examination guidelines;
" New standards for the review of trademarks;
* New requirement that legal operating system software be
installed on all computers manufactured in or imported
into China, and requirement that government agencies at
all levels purchase only such computers;
" Adoption of plan to encourage use of legal software by en-
terprises; steps to ensure government agencies use only le-
gal software.' 4
6
In terms of specific enforcement efforts, Yan Xiaohong, the
Deputy Director of the State Copyright Bureau, has stated that
China is tackling the problem as part of a step-by-step plan, in-
cluding its 2007 National Action Plan. 4 7 In the National Action
Plan, China promises to "accelerate the revision of the trade
mark [sic] law" and to "study on the improvement of the copy-
right law." '148 It also promises to "harness criminalization tools to
145. Alpana Roy, A New Dispute Concerning the TRIPS Agreement: The United States and
China in the WTO, 10(6) J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 476, 478 (2007) (citing D. Stewart & B.
Williams, The Impact of China's WTO Membership on the Review of the TRIPs Agreement 364,
in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Deborah
Z. Cass, Brett G. Williams & George Barker eds., 2003)).
146. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, supra note 77, para. 16.
147. Action Plan Unveiled to Fight IPR Offences, Chinese Government Official
Web Portal, Apr. 27, 2006, http://english.gov.cn/2006-04/27/content_267163.htm
(last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
148. The End of the Beginning, EUROMONEY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PLC, May 1,
2007, available at 2007 WLNR 10723445; see generally China's Action Plan on IPR Protection
2007, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200704/24/eng2007
0424_369187.html.
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achieve better punitive and deterrent effects."149 In addition,
Mu Xinsheng, the Minister of General Administration of Cus-
toms, has stated that Chinese and U.S. custom officials have al-
ready agreed to work together to tackle the enormous enforce-
ment problem, agreeing to "select better targets for IPR enforce-
ment and evaluate achievements," and "exchange data on the
number of seizures, quantity and value of goods, transportation
type and the main ports of transit used."'5 ° China undoubtedly
will argue-as President Hu Jintao recently has-that it needs
time to continue improving IPRs protection and enforcement,
but that it has clearly exhibited its commitment to do so.'
After framing its response with these general arguments,
China will charge a more complaint-specific response, rejecting
the United States' interpretation of "commercial scale," and ar-
guing that China does, in fact, provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied in cases of willful trademark counter-
feiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale. China can
argue that "commercial scale" should be interpreted narrowly to
include only those commercial activities that reach a certain
egregious level of infringement: a level that should be and is
distinctly different from that which defines civil liability.
Accordingly, in contrast to the United States' position that
"commercial scale" should include all commercial activities, re-
gardless of extent or magnitude, China could argue that a panel
must give effect to both words "commercial" and "scale." That is,
to give effect to the word "scale," the extent or magnitude of the
infringement must be taken into account. In other words, the
distribution, manufacture, sale, etc., of infringing products
would not fall within the definition of "commercial scale" unless
the counterfeiters reached a certain level of these activities.
Thus, for example, the distribution of a minimal amount of in-
fringing copies (e.g., ten) would not trigger liability even if en-
gaged in for a financial return. Similarly, activities that were not
149. Regrettably, the Plan provides no details about how China will achieve its lofty
goals. See generally China's Action Plan on IPR Protection 2007, supra note 148.
150. Clifford Coonan, China Pacts on Piracy, DAILY VARIETY, June 8, 2007, at 12,
available at 2007 WLNR 10718848.
151. China to Tighten IP laws, AuSTRALLAN IT NEws, June 11, 2007, para. 3, http://
australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,21884717-15306,00.html (quoting Chinese
President Hu Jintao: "China will continue to improve its laws and regulations on IPR
protection and will severely penalise IPR violations.").
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engaged in for a financial return, regardless of the extent or
magnitude of such activities, would not fall within the definition
or "commercial scale." This would give effect to the "commer-
cial" aspect of "commercial scale." Such a narrow reading would
be arguably consistent with the extraordinary nature of criminal
remedies in intellectual property cases.' 52
Under this interpretation, even accepting the United States'
CCA report evidence, 1 3 China could contend that it would have
been inappropriate to prosecute the administrative raid cases
that fell below the stated thresholds, because available civil reme-
dies were adequate.
China could then point to enforcement efforts that targeted
commercial scale piracy. For example, on April 14, 2007, China
reported that officials had destroyed thirty million pirated digital
DVDs, VCDs, CDs, and pieces of software as part of a campaign
to raise awareness of intellectual property issues in preparation
for World Intellectual Property Day. 154 China could also point
to its current crackdown on Internet Piracy, for which its State
Copyright Bureau launched two nation-wide operations result-
152. TRIPS does not, for example, require criminal penalties for all forms of intel-
lectual property rights violations, making optional penalties for trade secrets and pat-
ents. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 61. Even the United States recognizes that criminal
penalties should be reserved for egregious acts. See, e.g., DOJ IP MANUAL, supra note 8,
at 5.
153. China might challenge the survey as biased and limited, as it was conducted
by interested industries and targeted only certain cities within China, thus not repre-
senting China overall. These cities are all located in the eastern region of China and
may not represent the activity occurring in western, northern, or southern China. A
more balanced view might include cities within these parts of China. To be fair, how-
ever, these cities are also the major cities of technology and may in fact be the cities
where most infringing activities occur. While a panel has the right "to seek information
and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate" such as
third parties, it is less clear when a panel should accept information from a party and
the weight to be accorded such information. See Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; see also Panel Report,
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 7, W'T/DS58/R
(May 15, 1998) [hereinafter United States-Shrimp] (stating that a panel has discretion-
ary authority to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to
it); Panel Report, United States- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 6, WT/DS]60/R
Uune 15, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Section 110(5)]. As Chinese authorities likely carried
out these raids, it should be possible to verify the survey's accuracy.
154. See The End of the Beginning, supra note 148.
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ing in the closure of a number of "three-nothing" web sites.' 5 5 It
is these types of activities that warrant criminal penalties, China
would argue. 156
The Judicial Interpretations also underscore China's efforts
and point specifically to the contested thresholds. The April
2007 Judicial Interpretation in particular revises the rules for
criminal enforcement, lowering the thresholds and making it
easier for authorities to charge counterfeiters with intellectual
property crimes.
6. WTO Panel Decision
How would a WTO panel decide these issues? Before turn-
ing to the substantive aspects of the dispute, the WTO panel
must resolve preliminary issues of standard of review and burden
of proof.
a. Standard of Review, Burden of Proof, and Rules
of Treaty Interpretation
Regarding the standard of review that a panel must apply,
155. See, e.g., Copyright Infringement Crackdown Ahead of the Olympics, CHINA DAILY,
June 12, 2008, http://chinadaily.com.cn/olympics/2008-06/12/content_6756702.htm.
156. More forcefully, the United States can highlight China's protection efforts
with respect to its own intellectual property rights. Protection of China's Beijing 2008
Olympic trademarks is particularly relevant here. China took extraordinary efforts to
prevent fake Olympic goods from entering its market. China effectively minimized
piracy by passing separate laws protecting Olympic IP merchandise. These laws con-
tained higher punishments than the above IP laws, and calculated damages based on
the legitimate goods, rather than the unauthorized goods. See Omario Kanji, Paper
Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1261, 1270 (2006). These Olympic-specific laws "indicate[ ] that authorities are indeed
capable of instituting meaningful and effective IP protection, but the disparity between
it and Chinese law that applies to non-Chinese IP is a stark indication of Chinese bias in
IPR enforcement .... " Id. at 1284. While this may violate China's TRIPS Article 3
national treatment obligation, it does not necessarily violate China's Article 41 or 61
obligations. China's efforts to crack down on counterfeit Olympic merchandise in-
cluded seizure of nearly 30,000 fake Olympic souvenirs in February 2007; and a week
earlier, a crackdown on fake Olympic merchandise by Chinese customs officials in
which more than 100 cases of imported and exported Olympic trademark infringing
goods had been handled since 2002. See generally Jeff Franks, China Accused of Olympics
Merchandise Child Labour, THE STAR ONLINE, June 11, 2007, http://www.thestar.com.
my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/6/1 /worldupdates/2007-6-1 IT130153Z_01 NOOTR
_RTRMDNC 0 -302526-1&sec=Worldupdates. The United States would demand simi-
lar efforts in regard to protection of U.S. IPRs and argue that China's failure to provide
this violates its TRIPS obligations.
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Article 11 of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU") provides, in relevant part:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered
agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective as-
sessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make
such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the rec-
ommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the
covered agreements. 157
Accordingly, a panel must make an objective assessment of the
dispute in determining whether China's laws conform to TRIPS.
The burden of proof that applies in this dispute is well-es-
tablished. In United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Wo-
ven Wool Shirts and Blouses From India ("Shirts and Blouses"),
the Appellate Body addressed the appropriate framework for
resolving disputes under WTO agreements and established that
the burden rests upon the complaining party to establish a
prima facie case that a particular WTO provision has been vio-
lated. 158 A prima facie case is one which, "in the absence of ef-
fective refutation by the other party, requires a panel, as a matter
of law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the prima facie
case."'15 The complainant is also responsible for proving the ex-
istence of any fact it alleges. 60 Under the Shirts and Blouses
framework, the burden then shifts to the defending party to re-
but the prima facie case.' 6 ' Although the Shirts and Blouses
framework involved a non-TRIPS dispute, in United States-Sec-
157. DSU, supra note 153, art. 11, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1233 (1994).
158. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 1 14, W'AT/DS33/AB/R and Corr. 1 (Apr. 25, 1997)
(adopted May 23, 1997) [hereinafter United States-Shirts and Blouses]; see also US.-Sec-
tion 110(5), supra note 153, 6 (stating that the complaining party must establish prima
facie violation of basic rights provided under TRIPS).
159. Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 1 9, WT/DS267/RW
(Dec. 18, 2007).
160. See U.S.-Section 110(5), supra note 153, 6.
161. The burden is different in two different contexts. First, if a party relies on an
exception to the rights contained in a WTO Agreement, that party has the burden to
establish that the conditions, if any, for invoking such exception is fulfilled. See id. Sec-
ond, the burden of proof will be imposed on the defending party when the Member
relies on an affirmative defense. See United States- Shrimp, supra note 153, 1 7.
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tion 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,'6 2 the panel applied this
framework to a TRIPS dispute.1 63
Finally, Article 3(2) of the DSU requires the panel to apply
customary rules of public international law on the interpretation
of treaties. It is generally accepted that these rules are found in
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
of 1969 ("Vienna Convention" or "VCLT"). In particular, Article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 164
Consistent with the above WTO framework, the United
States has the burden to establish a prima facie case that China
has not complied with TRIPS Articles 41 and 61, and must pro-
vide proof for each fact it asserts. The burden then shifts to
China to rebut the prima facie case. And, the panel must inter-
pret TRIPS, specifically Articles 41 and 61, in good faith and in
light of TRIPS' objectives and purposes.
With these preliminary issues resolved, we turn to the dis-
pute.
b. China Should be Evaluated as a Developed Country
Elsewhere, I have argued that developing countries should
be afforded wide discretion in implementing their TRIPS obliga-
tions and that panels and the Appellate Body should interpret
ambiguous TRIPS provisions in developing countries' favor.'65
This would, at the very least, alleviate the large inequities in bar-
gaining power between the developed and developing countries
during the TRIPS negotiations and the lack of meaningful
choice on the part of the developing countries in adopting
TRIPS. TRIPS and the WTO Agreement also contain provisions
that specifically apply to least-developed and developing coun-
tries. 1 66 Thus, a country's status may have an impact in dispute
162. U.S.-Section 110(5), supra note 153, 6.12.
163. See id. 6.12-6.14; U.S.-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 158.
164. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT].
165. See generally Harris, supra note 12.
166. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 153, arts. 3(12), 4(10), 8(10). These articles give
preference to lesser developed countries but have played a very limited role in resolving
NAITO disputes.
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resolution. If so, for a number of reasons, China should be eval-
uated as a developed country, 16 7 and China should not be ac-
corded the wide discretion appropriately reserved for develop-
ing and least-developed countries. 168
As mentioned above, China's economy more resembles that
of a developed country than that of a developing country. More-
over, while China has been in a unique position to advance the
agenda for developing countries in the global trading scheme,
and is therefore capable of shifting the balance of power, it has
rejected that role. Instead, it has demonstrated ambivalence to-
wards advocating interests peculiar to developing countries and
has pursued national interests. At times, pursuit of its national
interests has led to opposition to the positions of developing
countries. 69 Further, China has reached a stage in its economic
development where status as a developed country-particularly
with regards to IP protection-is warranted. Still further, unlike
many developing countries that were not included in or did not
participate in the TRIPS negotiations, China was intimately in-
volved in the negotiations surrounding its WTO accession and
TRIPS adoption. China took on these commitments with full
knowledge of their importance and impact. China cannot ex-
tract the benefits of WTO membership without being fully ac-
countable for its obligations.
Accordingly, in appraising the complaint, the panel should
not afford China the same discretion it would grant other devel-
oping countries or interpret ambiguous provisions in China's
favor. As discussed below, however, this does not imply that
China will not be able to take advantage of the built-in flexibili-
ties that TRIPS provides. Thus, for example, the TRIPS pream-
ble states that in recognizing the need for new rules and disci-
plines, members should provide for effective and appropriate
means for the enforcement of trade-related IPRs, taking into ac-
167. See supra Part I.D.
168. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 12 (arguing that developing countries should be
granted wide discretion in implementing their TRIPS obligations in view of the unfair
bargaining conditions present during TRIPS negotiations).
169. See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 47 ("China often lends oral support and some-
times may even co-sponsor developing country proposals, but unlike Brazil or India,
does not take a leadership role by submitting papers on behalf of developing groups or
speaking out on their behalf, or trying to attract other developing countries to join its
proposals."); see generally Harris, supra note 12.
[Vol. 32:96
THE HONEYMOON IS OVER
count differences in national systems. 7 ' As such, a WTO panel
should be mindful that China's current legal system is relatively
new and differs from the systems used in the United States and
other countries.
c. Willful Trademark Infringement and Copyright Piracy
on a Commercial Scale
The gravamen of the United States' complaint is that
China's criminal laws do not provide remedies for willful trade-
mark infringement and copyright piracy committed on a com-
mercial scale. The United States must prove that the stated
thresholds are insufficient to encompass commercial scale coun-
terfeiting and piracy.
i. What is "On a Commercial Scale?"
In ruling on the United States' complaint and interpreting
Articles 41 and 61, the panel must interpret "commercial scale."
This will be the crucial issue in this dispute. If the panel inter-
prets the term broadly, as recommended by the United States,
the United States may prevail on its claim that activity occurs
below a level that constitutes commercial scale piracy. If, on the
other hand, the panel interprets the term more narrowly, the
United States will have a more difficult time establishing a prima
facie case.
To interpret "commercial scale," the panel will first turn to
TRIPS itself and find that TRIPS does not define "commercial
scale." 71 The panel will next look to prior WTO decisions. Al-
though WTO jurisprudence does not follow stare decisis, prior
Appellate Body decisions carry great weight. Again, however,
this inquiry will take little time. There have been three WATO-
TRIPS complaints that address TRIPS' enforcement provisions
of Articles 41 and 61. All of these were initiated by the United
States. 17 2 However, none of these complaints required that a
170. See TRIPS, supra note 6, pmbl.
171. TRIPS does not define "willful" either, but that should pose little problem
and is not at issue. Willful generally refers to a specific intent or knowledge of the
infringement.
172. These disputes include: (1) the United States' complaint against Sweden, as-
serting that Sweden did not make available provisional measures in the context of civil
proceedings; Request for Consultations by the United States, Sweden-Measures Affecting
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 'Ar/DS86/1 (June 2, 1997); (2) the United
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panel be created, as all of them were resolved by a mutually
agreed upon solution.'73 Since none of these complaints pro-
ceeded beyond the initial filing stage, they provide no guidance.
The WTO thus will be in "uncharted jurisprudential territory. '"174
ii. The "Ordinary Meaning" of "Commercial Scale"
The panel next will determine the "ordinary meaning" of
"commercial scale," in its context and in light of TRIPS' object
and purpose. 175 Panels and the Appellate Body have relied heav-
ily on dictionary meanings when ascertaining the "ordinary
meaning.' 1 76 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "commer-
cial" as "concerned with or engaged in commerce," and "making
or intended to make a profit."177 The Oxford English Dictionary
defines "scale" as (1) "a graduated range of values forming a
standard system for measuring or grading something;" (2) "a
measuring instrument based on such a system;" and (3) relative
size or extent.17  Under these definitions, a panel can find that
any infringement in which the infringer engages in commerce
or intends to make a profit constitutes commercial scale for
which criminal penalties are appropriate. Thus, any single act of
infringement may fall within this definition and any stated
threshold above one would be inconsistent with TRIPS Article
61.179
This appears to be the United States' interpretation, as it
argues that the term "commercial scale" extends to those who
engage in commercial activities in order to make a financial re-
States' complaint that Greece did not provide effective remedies against copyright in-
fringement with respect to unauthorized broadcasts of copyrighted motion pictures and
television programs; Request for Consultations by the United States, Greece-Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs, W1rT/DS125/1 (May
7, 1998); and (3) a companion complaint against the European Union for Greece's
failure to provide effective remedies for copyright infringement. Request for Consulta-
tions by the United States, European Community-Enforcement of Intellectual Property for
Motion Pictures and Television Programs, W rT/DS124/1 (Apr. 30, 1998).
173. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
174. See ABBorr ET AL., supra note 86, at 613.
175. See U.S.-Section 110(5), supra note 153, 6.43.
176. See id.
177. See Definition of Commercial, COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON-
LINE, http://www.askoxford.com/conciseoed/commercial?view=uk.
178. See Definition of Scale, COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http:/
/www.askoxford.com/conciseoed/scale_3?view=uk.
179. This definition would also fittingly preserve space for private use, as long as
no profit was made.
[Vol. 32:96
THE HONEYMOON IS OVER
turn, regardless of the extent or magnitude of the commercial
activities. If this is indeed the preferred definition, it is still not
clear that the United States has presented enough evidence to
establish a prima facie case that China has violated TRIPS.'8 0
While the United States has demonstrated that much com-
mercial activity occurs under China's stated thresholds, it has not
demonstrated that this is an unacceptable level of commercial
activity. As a preliminary matter, it is not clear how a panel
should engage in fact-finding. DSU Article 13 allows a panel to
accept and consider or reject information submitted to it, but
does not address whether a panel must accept information pro-
vided by a party to the dispute.' 8 ' It is thus not clear how the
panel should treat the CCA Report, whether or not China at-
tacks the accuracy or credibility of the Report. Nevertheless,
WTO disputes involve a great deal of diplomacy and it is highly
unlikely a panel will outright reject a party's evidence, even if
clearly biased. Thus, for purposes of this Article, we will assume
that the panel will accept the CCA Report, whether or not it will
accept the conclusions based in it.
As regards to the United States' argument that the CCA Re-
port demonstrates an unacceptable level of commercial activity,
the survey evidence demonstrates that about seventeen percent
of the administrative raid cases are subject to criminal penalties.
The United States' own criminal statistics reveal that this may be
an appropriate level. In 2002, for example, in the United States,
8254 civil cases were filed as compared to 405 criminal cases.' 8 2
Criminal cases thus represented about five percent of the total
180. The Appellate Body has not resolved the question of what standard must be
met in order to establish a primafacie case that a violation has occurred. The Appellate
Body has, however, stated that there should not be a single standard and that "precisely
how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a
presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and
case to case." United States-Shirts and Blouses, supra note 158, at 14; see also Peter
Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WVTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1248
(1998). Of course, should the panel conclude that the United States fails in establish-
ing a violation of Articles 41 and 61, China would not have to invoke any justification or
exception to defend the United States' case. See U.S.-Section 110(5), supra note 153,
6.16.
181. DSU, supra note 153, art. 13.
182. ABBOi-r, ET AL., supra note 86, at 614 (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: Intellectual Property Theft, 2002 (2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipt2.pdf). Of those convicted, less
than half received prison time. Id.
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cases filed. These statistics "do not from a 'numerical' stand-
point suggest that a large number of actions are required to evi-
dence compliance with WTO obligations. '"183 Assuming the ac-
curacy and relevancy of the CCA Report evidence, seventeen
percent of Chinese actions may, from a numerical standpoint
and in light of China's embryonic legal system, be appropriate.
Nonetheless, this broad interpretation rejecting thresholds
may go too far. An interpretation in which any single infringing
act can subject an infringer to criminal sanctions would cast a
wide net that would capture infringing acts such as the intended
sale of a single CD or DVD, in addition to capturing large-scale
commercial activities. It seems unlikely that WTO members
would extend criminal sanctions to this conduct in light of the
civil remedies also made mandatorily available for such conduct
and the concern during TRIPS negotiations that criminal penal-
ties be limited to "professional infringers." '184 In short, criminal
liability should not be coextensive with civil liability. More im-
portantly, such a reading reads out of Article 61 the term "scale."
In other words, this reading reads "commercial" and "scale" as
two separate and independent requirements, each of which
would be sufficient to require criminal penalties. Stated differ-
ently, this interpretation reads "commercial scale" as "commer-
cial or scale," rather than "commercial scale." By focusing solely
on "commercial," this interpretation would include commercial
activity that does not depend upon the magnitude or extent of
the activity.' 85 While such a reading of Article 61 is possible, it is
less plausible in view of the difficulty that Members had in agree-
ing on criminal sanctions and the role criminal sanctions are in-
tended to play, which is to deter egregious acts of infringement.
Instead, "commercial scale" might be read to include both com-
mercial activity and a certain level or magnitude of that activity.
On the other hand, an interpretation that allows for large-
183. ABBOTT ET AL., supra note 86, at 614.
184. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 327
(2d ed. 2003).
185. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 61. Similarly, the United States contends that a
certain magnitude of piracy and counterfeiting should be sufficient to qualify as com-
mercial scale piracy and counterfeiting regardless of whether the activity is "commer-
cial." See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 110. While the United States is not
arguing that China's laws are inconsistent with this interpretation, it seems likely that
this interpretation also misses the point by focusing on one of the two terms (that is,
"scale" rather than "commercial scale").
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scale infringement, without an intent to profit or for no financial
return, also appears inconsistent with TRIPS' objective to protect
the private rights of intellectual property owners. Such activities
should not be excluded, because these activities are indeed com-
parable to commercial scale piracy, particularly from a rights
holders' vantage point. Similarly, small-scale piracy should be
excluded from the term "commercial scale," even if done for a
financial return, as mentioned above.
The United States' argument and the "commercial or scale"
interpretation highlights the difficulty with attacking thresholds.
As the United States argues, thresholds draw arbitrary lines in
delineating the types of trademark counterfeiting and copyright
piracy that is subject to criminal penalties.'86 Any threshold
would provide would-be infringers with the "safe harbor" about
which the United States complains. Line drawing as to a particu-
lar appropriate threshold seems problematic and, if required to
do so, a panel might afford China discretion to set its own
thresholds, in effect self-defining "on a commercial scale," rely-
ing on TRIPS Article 1 (1) (members are free to determine how
best to meet their obligations under TRIPS within the context of
their own legal systems).1 87
The plain language of Article 61 does not mandate specific
thresholds but rather suggests a more open-ended approach-
the freedom of countries to adopt different strategies. This af-
fords members discretion in an area as sensitive as criminal intel-
lectual property sanctions. This discretion creates breathing
space for countries to implement domestic policy, including tai-
loring intellectual property laws to specific values, goals, culture,
etc., and to permit experimentation in resolving particular issues
(the notion that member states are "laboratories of experimenta-
tion"). 188
It is thus doubtful that a panel will define "commercial
186. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 1 144 ("This constrained system ig-
nores a range of probative evidence demonstrating the existence of commercial scale
operations not captured using China's criminal thresholds.").
187. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1(1).
188. See, e.g., Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law To Decide
Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (2005) (arguing, among
other reasons, that, when it is practically impossible to assess empirically what the
proper balance in intellectual property laws should be, it is better to allow for a diversity
of approaches among countries to avoid magnifying the harm imposed by a single bad
rule).
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scale" in terms of threshold units (or, for that matter, specific
dollar amounts). The panel rather may define commercial scale
by looking to certain levels where commercial piracy has a signif-
icant adverse impact on the rights holders, while also consider-
ing the nature of the illegal enterprise. An interpretational defi-
nition based on the impact on the rights holders would be con-
sistent with the language of Article 61 and would also be
consistent with the overall object and purpose of TRIPS, i.e., the
need to protect the rights holders' private rights and "the need
to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights."189 Moreover, such an interpretation would still
leave considerable flexibility for countries to address criminal in-
tellectual property enforcement, would capture large-scale non-
commercial activity, and should also exclude small-scale com-
mercial activities.
An interpretation based on the impact on an intellectual
property owner's rights will involve a fact-driven inquiry, which
will not depend solely on resort to a particular threshold. 9 °
Rather, facts relevant to this inquiry would include:
(1) the number and type of infringers;
(2) the quantity of each infringer's inventory;
(3) the price comparisons between legitimate and infring-
ing goods;
(4) the difference in quality between legitimate and in-
fringing goods; and
(5) the type and size of the rights holder's business. ' 91
189. See TRIPS, supra note 6, pmbl.
190. Thresholds might still play a role, for example, by stating that a certain
threshold delineates prejudicial impact from non-prejudicial impact. Thresholds will
need to be specific, however, to the particular type of good or work involved. For exam-
ple, thresholds that constitute prejudicial impact with respect to CDs/DVDs would not
be the same as those that constitute prejudicial impact for so-called "fast-moving con-
sumer goods," such as personal care products or small electronics, that sell quickly and
at low prices. See, e.g., U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 121. Nevertheless, relying
on the prejudicial impact should reduce, if not eliminate, the need to look to thresh-
olds.
191. These facts are principally focused on determining whether a rights holders'
interest is prejudiced but, admittedly, may be difficult to determine. For example, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the enterprises and infringing businesses in
China's market. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 122 (noting that a single
wholesale mall in Yiwu, China, "houses some 30,000 stores, many of them in small 10-by-
15 foot stalls.").
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In view of these factors, it is not clear that the United States has
presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that
China has violated TRIPS. First, it is not clear what percentage
of establishments and enterprises the CCA Report includes. Spe-
cifically, the United States argues that the Chinese market for
copyright and trademark goods "is fragmented and character-
ized by a profusion of small manufacturers, middlemen, and dis-
tributors."' 92 Yet, the CCA Report looks to only 2000 complaints
filed against some retail targets. 93 Also, the CCA Report fo-
cused on the establishments operating under or above the stated
thresholds and did not look to the economic or prejudicial im-
pact on the rights holder.'94
Although it is less likely, in addition to looking to the ordi-
nary meaning or a policy-based approach to interpret "commer-
cial scale," a panel might interpret "commercial scale" or deter-
mine appropriate criminal sanctions by resort to an additional
source, which incidentally also might support a prejudicial im-
pact interpretation.'95 By looking to other countries' criminal
intellectual property laws, a panel may glean an appropriate in-
ternational standard upon which to base TRIPS' standard. A
panel can justify resort to national laws in interpreting TRIPS
provisions as a "subsequent practice" by WTO members.' 96 As
192. Id. (citing Don Lee, 30,000-Store Wholesale Mall Keeps Chinese Competitive, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 8, 2006, at A-31, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=
/c/a/2006/12/08/MNG8TMRPV81.DTL).
193. Id. 155.
194. Id. 157-61.
195. See DSU, supra note 153, art. 13(2) ("Panels may seek information from any
relevant source ....").
196. VCLT, supra note 164, art. 31(3) (b); See also Panel Report, Canada-Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Wtrr/DS1 14/R (March 17, 2000). Canada made a
similar argument that the INTO should consider the national laws of member countries
in determining whether Canada complied with its TRIPS obligations. In the context of
TRIPS exceptions to patent rights, the panel rejected this argument.
More remotely, a panel might look to TRIPS provisions that allow exceptions to
rights holders' intellectual property rights ("exception provisions") and to those cases
interpreting those provisions ( "exception cases"). In particular, Articles 13 and 17 of
the TRIPS Agreement allow for certain exceptions to copyrights and trademarks if such
exceptions meet a tripartite test: the exceptions must be limited to (1) certain special
cases; (2) which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work; and (3) which
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. At first
blush, applying a standard for exceptions to a standard for criminal liability seems odd;
however, both place limits on unacceptable conduct, and the exception provisions pro-
hibit conduct that has a prejudicial impact on a rights holder's interest-a standard
comparable to the proposed prejudicial impact of "commercial scale" provision in Arti-
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such, national laws can demonstrate practices that might be rele-
vant as indicators of certain norms shared by countries, or evi-
dence that countries interpret specific provisions in similar ways.
d. Various Developed Countries' Criminal
Intellectual Property Laws
The Vienna Convention permits judicial bodies to resort to
additional interpretive aids to assist in interpreting treaties, spe-
cifically allowing resort to "any subsequent practice in the appli-
cation of the treaty."'1 97 Thus, a review of Member Countries'
national criminal intellectual property laws may be relevant in
ascertaining an international standard for appropriate criminal
sanctions. Particularly relevant would be national laws that spe-
cifically define "commercial scale" and laws that include liability
thresholds. Remedies of imprisonment and monetary fines may
also be relevant in determining whether the criminal laws are
sufficient to provide a deterrent. To the extent that a pattern or
standard emerges, a panel could determine that it is appropriate
to apply such a standard to this dispute. Two points should be
made, however. First, whether five years in a U.S. prison corre-
sponds to five years in a Chinese prison is unknown. For pur-
poses of this analysis, we will assume this is so. Second, different
countries' legal systems are at different stages. For example, the
United States' legal system must be considered-particularly in
comparison to China's-a mature system. Thus, the standards
necessary to ensure compliance with laws or to deter infringe-
ment in each country may not be the same-nor should they
be. 98 With these points in mind, we first turn to the United
cle 61. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 13, 17, 61 (allowing for exceptions to copy-
right). Similar TRIPS provisions also exist in Articles 17 and 30 for exceptions to trade-
marks and patents, respectively. See id. arts. 17, 30.
197. VCLT, supra note 164, art. 31(3)(b).
198. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, pmbl. (noting that in providing for effective
enforcement means, differences in national legal systems must be taken into account).
This also raises additional concerns. Should countries' criminal intellectual property
laws resemble each other in order for each country to comply with their TRIPS obliga-
tions? Arguably, they should not. TRIPS affords sufficient discretion and flexibility to
each country such that national laws can differ significantly and still comply with TRIPS.
Assuming this is so, a second question becomes whether China's criminal intellectual
property laws should be compared with developed or developing countries' national
laws. This was addressed earlier. These issues also highlight the problems with looking
to national laws to interpret treaties. Which laws should be reviewed? Unless a panel
reviews each member's laws-a daunting task, considering the V11o consists of over
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States' system.
i. The United States
The United States' criminal copyright laws are found in 17
U.S.C. § 506, which defines the prohibited conduct, and 18
U.S.C. § 2319, which sets forth the punishment. Section 506 sep-
arates misdemeanor criminal offenses from felony criminal of-
fenses. An infringer commits a misdemeanor if that person will-
fully infringes a copyright, and the infringement was committed
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gainf:
"by the reproduction or distribution, during any 180-day period,',..
of one or more copies of one or more copyrighted works, which'
have a total retail value of more than US$1000; or by the distri-
bution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by
making it available on a computer network accessible to mem-
bers of the public, if such person knew or should have known
that the work was intended for commercial distribution."' 99 Two
things stand out about the misdemeanor copyright laws. First,
liability attaches only if the infringer's motive was for "commer-
cial advantage or private financial gain."200 Second, the numeri-
cal threshold is one-an infringer is criminally liable for the re-
production of a single copy of a single copyrighted work.20 1 The
minimum sentence is a maximum of one year in prison and/or a
fine.20 2
150 members-a review of national laws will necessarily produce an ad hoc and partial
view of national practice. One can reasonably ask whether such a review can shed any
light on the meaning of a WTO Agreement.
199. 17 U.S.C §§ 506(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2005). Section 506 also details other actions
that may give rise to criminal misdemeanor charges: (1) fraudulent placing of a copy-
right notice on a work; (2) fraudulent removal of a copyright notice; and (3) knowingly
making a false representation of a material fact in an application for copyright registra-
tion. Id. §§ 506(c)-(e).
200. 17 U.S.C § 506(a) (1) (A) (2005); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
§ 506, 90 Stat. 2541, 2586 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1976)). The
Copyright Act of 1976 revamped this criminal provision by changing the previous re-
quirement, i.e., "for profit," to the "for purposes of commercial advantage" standard.
This lowered the standard from requiring that the defendant actually profit from in-
fringing activities to an intent to profit from the activity. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-553, § 506, 90 Stat. 2541, 2586 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(1976)); see also United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 539-40 (D. Mass. 1994)
(noting that an infringer acts for commercial advantage or private financial gain if he
seeks a profit.); 4 NIMMER ON COPRMIGHT § 15.01 [A) [2].
201. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1) (B).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (3) (2005).
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Felony liability attaches when the violation is willful and
consists of the reproduction or distribution of at least ten copies
that are valued together at more than US$2500. 2 3 The felony
threshold is higher in order to exclude low-level infringement
such as "children making copies for friends as well as other inci-
dental copying of copyrighted works having a relatively low retail
value. 2 0 ' The maximum felony sentence is ten years imprison-
ment and/or a fine.20 5
The No Electronic Theft Act of 1997 ("NET Act") is the lat-
est amendment to the U.S. criminal copyright laws. 206 The NET
Act makes it a felony to reproduce or distribute copies of copy-
righted works electronically regardless of whether the defendant had a
profit motive.20 7 The change reflects the ease of using the In-
203. Id. §§ 2319(b) (1), (c)(1). Four essential elements are required to prove fel-
ony copyright infringement: (1) a registered copyright exists; (2) the defendant acted
willfully; (3) the defendant infringed by reproducing or distributing the copyrighted
work; and (4) the works infringed were at least 10 copies of one or more copyrighted
works with a total value of US$2500 and were made or sold within a 180-day period.
Laura Gasaway, Criminal Copyright Infringement, INFO. OUTLOOK, Apr. 2004, http://find
articles.com/p/articles/mi_mOFWE/is_4_8/ai_n6108144. Under amendments en-
acted in 2005, felony liability also attaches when the violation involves the distribution
of a work being prepared for commercial distribution over a publicly-accessible com-
puter network. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(d) (2).
204. H.R. REP. No. 102-997, at 6 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3569, 3574.
These criminal infringement provisions were the result of 1982 amendments, which
made more serious crimes punishable as felonies. See generally Gasaway, supra note 203.
There is also a question as to what "retail value" means. Generally, this will mean the
value of the legitimate good; however, in certain situations, under the Criminal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, the term "retail value" refers to the value of the infringing product.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmt. n.2(c) (2007); DOJ IP MANUAL,
supra note 8 at 71. The DOJ IP Manual acknowledges that calculating a work's retail
value can be complicated, such as when the work has appeared in multiple versions,
and states that the market value may be used instead in some circumstances. See id. at
48.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (2), (d)(4).
206. No Electronic Theft Act ("NET Act"), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678
(1997). Congress is considering a bill to further strengthen criminal copyright penal-
ties. See Declan McCullagh, Major Copyright Bill Boost Penalties, Creates New Agency, THE
ICONOcLAST, Dec. 5, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9829826-38.html. Ac-
cording to McCullagh, the new bill "ratchets up civil penalties for copyright infringe-
ment, boosts criminal enforcement, and even creates a new federal agency charged
with bringing about a national and international copyright crackdown." Id. para. 3.
207. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1) (B). Thus, criminal liability is triggered when the in-
fringement: (1) is for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain or
(2) involves the reproduction or distribution of one or more copies of a work or works
within a 180-day period with a total retail value of US$1000. See id. A commercially
motivated infringer, however, receives a higher penalty, up to a five-year federal prison
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ternet to distribute copyrighted works and also the reality that
the Internet allows infringers to engage in large-scale infringe-
ment without a desire for financial gain, all with devastating ef-
fects for the intellectual property rights holder.2 °"
As for trademark infringement, selling one counterfeit item
is a felony-there is no misdemeanor trademark crime.20 9
ii. The European Union: The Intellectual Property
Enforcement Directive
In 2004, the European Parliament and the European Coun-
cil issued Council Directive 2004/48/EC, the Intellectual Prop-
erty Enforcement Directive ("IP Enforcement Directive" or "Di-
rective"). 21" The Directive's objective is to ensure a "high,
equivalent and homogenous level" of intellectual property pro-
tection throughout the European Union.211 The IP Enforce-
ment Directive does not establish criminal procedures and pen-
alties for member countries to adopt (but does note that in addi-
tion to civil measures, criminal sanctions also constitute a means
of ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights). 212
The Directive is instructive, however, because it provides for spe-
cific measures that apply only with regard to infringement com-
mitted "on a commercial scale. '213 The Directive defines "com-
mercial scale" as acts "carried out for direct or indirect economic
or commercial advantage. 21 4 This is consistent with the previ-
ous ordinary meaning as being "engaged in commerce," and
"making or intended to make a profit." While the Directive and
this particular definition are instructive, it is nonetheless an
edict, and because it did not make its way into Members' laws, it
term and US$250,000 in fines; a noncommercial willful infringer is subject to up to a
one-year prison term and US$100,000 in fines. See generally Gasaway, supra note 203.
208. See generally Gasaway, supra note 203.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2006).
210. Directives are addressed to the Member States and are binding with respect to
the results to be achieved. Member States have discretion in choosing the particular
form to implement the results. See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
NORMS, AcroRs, PROCESS, A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 256 (2002).
211. Council Directive No. 2004/48, 10, OJ. L 157/45, at 49 (2004) (hereinafter
"Directive" or "IP Enforcement Directive").
212. Id. 28. The Directive also makes clear that it does not affect Member States'
international obligations under TRIPS relating to criminal penalties and procedures.
Id. art. 2(3).
213. See id. arts. 6(2), 8(1), and 9(2).
214. Id. 14.
2008]
150 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
can only provide insight into how individual Members might in-
terpret "commercial scale."
iii. France
In France, Articles L. 335-1 et seq. of the Intellectual Prop-
erty Code set out the provisions governing criminal sanctions for
copyright infringement. Article L. 335-2 of the Intellectual Prop-
erty Code provides for imprisonment of up to three years and
fines of up to EUR300,000 (US$463,409) for any infringing act,
including the sale, exportation, and importation of infringing
works. 2 15 Article L. 335-9, in cases of habitual offenders, allows
for doubling the period of imprisonment or the amount of fines.
Applying the IP Directive's "commercial scale" definition here
might imply that one infringing act leads inexorably to "direct or
indirect economic or commercial advantage."
iv. Germany
Under German copyright law (Urheberrechtsgesetz), sections
106 et seq. of the Copyright Act establish criminal copyright in-
fringement sanctions for acts defined by reference to definitions
that trigger civil sanctions. But, these acts are interpreted in ac-
cord with the interpretive rules applied in criminal cases. In par-
ticular, unlike civil sanctions, criminal sanctions are available
only for intentional, rather than merely negligent, infringe-
ment.216 Germany's criminal law provisions refer to the "unau-
thorized exploitation of copyrighted works" and include the re-
production, distribution, public communication, and any adap-
tation or a transformation of a work.21 7 Convicted infringers are
subject to imprisonment for up to three years or a fine. 2 18 Fur-
215. Law No. 94-102 of February 5, 1994, Journal Officiel de la RIpublique Franfaise
[JO.] [Official Gazette of France], February 8, 1994, art. L335-2 (Fr.), translated in
http://wvv.legifrance.gouv.fr (2003) ("Any edition of writings, musical compositions,
drawings, paintings or other printed or engraved production made in whole or in part
contrary to the laws and regulations relating to the property of authors shall constitute
an infringement; any infringement shall constitute an offense. Infringement in France
of works published in France or abroad shall be punishable with a two-year prison term
and a fine of FRF 1,000,000. The sale, exportation and importation of infringing works
shall be subject to the same penalties."). Articles L335-3 to L335-7 set forth additional
infringing acts. See id. arts. L335-3-L-335-7.
216. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], art. 15 (F.R.G).
217. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG], art. 106 (F.R.G. Copyright Law) (published 9
Sept. 1965, last amended on 8 May 1998).
218. Id.
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ther, Section 108a provides that when a person commits the
above infringing acts "on a commercial basis" the person is sub-
ject to imprisonment up to five years or a fine. The section does
not define "on a commercial basis."
v. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom 1988 Copyright Act also contains
criminal copyright provisions, which, unlike civil liability, require
proof of knowledge or reason to know that a copyright was being
or would be infringed. 219 Section 107 of the 1988 Copyright Act,
entitled "Criminal liability for making or dealing with infringing
articles, &c.," provides that, for summary convictions, a person
who commits an offense is subject to a prison term not exceed-
ing six months and a fine not exceeding the statutory maxi-
mum.220 For indictments, a person is subject to a prison term
not exceeding ten years and a fine. 2 2 ' A person commits an of-
fense by selling, making, importing, exhibiting, distributing, or
"distribut[ing] otherwise than in the course of a business to such
an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright" an
article which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe is,
an infringing copy of a copyrighted work.2 2 2
vi. Argentina
Articles 71 et seq. of the Copyright Act establishes criminal
sanctions under Argentine law. Article 71 penalizes whoever in
any way or form infringes upon those rights recognized by the
Act as if he had committed a fraudulent act.223 Article 72 enu-
merates the following "fraudulent" acts subject to criminal liabil-
ity: (1) the unauthorized reproduction of a work; (2) piracy
under cover of the misappropriated name of an authorized pub-
lisher; (3) the publication of a work while suppressing or alter-
ing the name of its author; (4) the publication of more copies
than authorized; and (5) the modification of the text of a
219. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 107 (Eng.).
220. See id. § 107(4) (a).
221. Id. § 107(4)(b).
222. Id.
223. See Miguel A. Emery, Economic Rights; Enforcement, in INT-ERNATIONAL COP-
RIGHT LAW AND PRACrICE ARG § 8 (2008); Intellectual Property Law No. 11.723 (Sept.
28, 1933), art. 71 (Arg.).
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work.2 2 ' Each of these acts appears to apply to a single infring-
ing work. Because copyright infringement is equated to fraud,
some courts have held that criminal copyright infringement re-
quires bad faith.225
vii. Australia
Australian law also subjects certain infringing acts to crimi-
nal liability. Among those infringing acts are acts in which the
infringement constitutes "commercial-scale infringement . . .
that has a prejudicial impact on the copyright owner. "226 Other
acts that trigger criminal liability are: (1) making infringing cop-
ies commercially; (2) selling or hiring out, or offering to sell or
hire out, an infringing copy; (3) exhibiting an infringing copy in
public commercially; (4) importing an infringing copy commer-
cially; (5) distributing an infringing copy for purpose of trade or
commercial gain; (6) possessing an infringing copy with the in-
tention of selling it, letting it for hire, offering to sell or let it,
distributing it for commercial gain, exhibiting it in public; (7)
making or possessing a device for making infringing copies; (8)
advertising the supply of infringing copies; (9) causing a public
performance that infringes copyright; (10) causing a recording
or film to be heard or seen in public that infringes copyright;
and (11) converting a work or other subject matter from a hard
copy or analog form to a digital form, which is treated as an
"aggravated offense."2 2 7
Criminal offenses in the Copyright Act are divided into in-
dictable, summary, and strict liability offenses. The main differ-
ence between these tiered offenses concerns the level of fault
that must be satisfied and the penalties that apply. To establish
an indictable offense, it is necessary to show that the infringe-
ment was either intentional or reckless.228 Most summary of-
224. See Emery, supra note 223, § 8.
225. Id. Other courts disagree.
226. Copyright Act, 2006, § 132AC (Austl.) (introduced by Copyright Act Amend-
ment Act 2006).
227. Id. at §§ 132AC-AO.
228. Indictable offenses have maximum penalties of imprisonment for five years
and/or between 550 to 850 penalty units for natural persons. See Brad Sherman &
James Lahore, Economic Rights & Enforcement, in IN-TERNATIONAL COPYRGHT LAw AND
PRACrTcE AUS, § 8 (2007).
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fenses require intention and/or negligence.229 The strict liabil-
ity offenses do not contain a fault requirement. They target
lower levels of commercial piracy such as the sale of pirated
works at street markets. To avoid criminalizing activities consid-
ered to be a legitimate part of commercial life, strict liability of-
fenses only apply in a limited number of cases and are subject to
multiple defenses.210
viii. Brazil
Brazilian law criminalizes copyright infringement used "for
commercial purposes or with gainful intent. ''2 1' This includes
the unauthorized copying, holding or distributing of infringing
copies, or public communication. Penalties include fines,
seizure, destruction or loss of infringing materials, suspension of
the offender's permission to operate for designated periods of
time, and mandatory sentences of up to four years. While the
threshold appears to be one consistent with other countries, Bra-
zilian law does allow for private use. A person can copy a work of
authorship or phonogram for private use, even if such copy
amounts to a complete reproduction, provided that only one
copy is made.23 2
ix. Canada
Under the Canadian Copyright Act,233 a person who com-
mits certain infringing acts also commits a summary criminal of-
fense and may be indicted at the prosecutor's discretion. The
Supreme Court of Canada has held that copyright infringement
is not theft under the Criminal Code, but a charge of fraud is,
perhaps anomalously, still available. Canadian law also requires
a specific mens rea: the infringer must have acted intentionally,
or recklessly with knowledge of the facts constituting the offense,
or with willful blindness.234
229. These have maximum penalties of imprisonment for two years and/or 120
penalty units. See id.
230. The maximum penalty for a strict liability offense is sixty penalty units for a
natural person. Id.
231. ManoelJ. Pereira dos Santos & Otto B. Lickse, Economic Rights &Enforcement,
in INTERNATIONAL COPnRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE BRA, § 8 (2007).
232. See id.
233. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 30, s.1, § 42 et seq. (Can.).
234. See id.
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x. India
The final two countries include India and South Korea,
which provide comparable Asian countries for assessment.
Under Indian law, Sections 63 through 69 of the Copyright Act
deal with offenses relating to the infringement of copyrights and
provide for the punishments of imprisonment or fines or
both. 235 The Amendment Act of 1994 provides for a minimum
punishment of imprisonment for a period of not less than seven
days, but one which may extend to three years, and for fines not
less than 50,000 Rupees, but which may extend to 200,000 Ru-
pees, for any person who knowingly makes, or uses on a com-
puter an infringing copy of a computer program.236 A court has
discretion to impose a fine of 50,000 rupees only if the infring-
ing copy is not used for gain or in the course of trade or business
(e.g., for private use).237
xi. South Korea
Under South Korea's criminal laws, a person who infringes
a work willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or pri-
vate financial gain is subject to penalties including KRW
500,000238 or imprisonment for not more than five years. 239 Pen-
alties may be increased for repeat offenders, with imprisonment
of ten years and/or a fine of not more than KRW 1,000,000.240
Whether this section's brief review of various countries'
criminal intellectual property laws demonstrates an international
standard for "on a commercial scale" is debatable. Only one
',tprovision (the IP Enforcement Directive) actually defines "com-
mercial scale," and that definition (indirect or direct economic
advantage) is sufficiently vague as to provide little guidance.2 4 1
235. See The Copyright Act §§ 63-69 (India).
236. See The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 1994,
§ 63B (India).
237. See id.
238. KRW is the currency of South Korea.
239. See Copyright Act art. 136, as amended February 29, 2008 (S. Korea).
240. See id. art. 136(2).
241. See Directive, supra note 211, 1 14. Taken at face value, Council Directive No.
2004/48 ("IP Enforcement Directive" or "Directive") is expansive, as it is difficult to
imagine any infringing conduct that is not either directly or indirectly carried out for
direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage. Think, for example, of copies
being made for home use. Such conduct provides a direct or indirect economic advan-
tage, as the copier avoids having to pay for an additional work. Of course, because
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The review, however, does reveal one striking similarity among
the laws. With the exception of the United States' felony crimi-
nal infringement law, none of the laws require a threshold limit
above one single infringing act to trigger criminal liability.
Thus, it is tempting to suggest that an international standard ex-
ists that defines "commercial scale" in this manner. Accordingly,
any standard applying any thresholds-such as China's-is in-
consistent with international norms and, arguably, violates
TRIPS. (Countries might have discretion with respect to other
elements, for example, a particular mens rea such as willful or
knowingly, or a particular monetary threshold.) This would sup-
port the United States' position, and an international standard
without a numerical threshold would remedy the arbitrary
threshold concern and could be justified on deterrence
grounds.242 As such, the United States could credibly argue, and
a panel could find, that China's laws containing thresholds vio-
late TRIPS. China would be required to amend its laws by re-
moving all threshold barriers, thus providing effective enforce-
ment and deterrence.
On the other hand, many of the countries' laws require that
infringing acts be carried out for commercial advantage or finan-
cial gain (e.g., Australia, Brazil, the European Union, South Ko-
rea, and the United States) and a number of countries impose
criminal liability only when the infringing acts prejudicially af-
fect the rights owner (e.g., Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). This would imply that small-scale infringe-
ment is immune from criminal sanctions and again underscore
the benefit of individual flexibility.
In the end, China's lack of conformity with other countries'
laws is a far cry from declaring that China's thresholds are incon-
sistent with China's TRIPS obligations under Articles 41 and 61,
particularly as it is not clear that an international standard does
exist. Moreover, in arguing that no threshold is appropriate, it is
difficult to ignore the United States' ten-copy threshold.243 At
TRIPS allows for members to go beyond their TRIPS obligations, the EU Directive
might be characterized as providing for criminal penalties beyond what is required.
242. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 151.
243. While it is certainly easy to understand the rationale for allowing this thresh-
old, i.e., to exclude low-level infringement from possible enhanced penalties, it is less
clear why this could not also be accomplished without the threshold by way of
prosecutorial discretion. In other words, even by providing that criminal penalties will
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the very least, a panel could conclude that the United States'
criminal copyright law suggests that the United States recognizes
that some threshold may be appropriate in defining "commer-
cial scale" (or in deterring infringement), and that China's laws
similarly recognize the suitability of thresholds. Of course, the
panel would still have to determine the much more difficult
question as to what the appropriate threshold should be, but this
is sure to favor China.
In sum, based on policy concerns and to effectuate TRIPS'
objective to protect the rights of intellectual property owners, a
panel might define "commercial scale" not by reference to par-
ticular thresholds, but instead by reference to whether infring-
ing acts prejudice the rights of intellectual property owners.
Support for such an interpretation comes not only from TRIPS'
objective, but also from various countries' laws and from the un-
derlying policy mandating criminal sanctions. Thus, with sup-
port also from the ordinary meaning of the term "commercial
scale," a panel will likely find that TRIPS Article 61 requires
China to provide for criminal sanctions for large-scale commer-
cial and noncommercial infringement, but allow for small-scale
commercial and noncommercial infringement. China's laws, in-
cluding the thresholds, monetary limitations, and specific mens
rea, should pass muster under this standard and be found as con-
sistent with China's TRIPS obligations, particularly in light of
China's nascent legal system. The United States may also be re-
quired to submit additional evidence concerning the prejudicial
impact that infringing conduct causes, such as an unreasonable
loss of income, to determine whether the roughly seventeen per-
cent of infringers that fall outside the stated thresholds justify a
finding that China's laws, indeed, might not comply with TRIPS.
7. Do Remedies Constitute a Deterrent to Infringement?
The United States' other claim is that the high thresholds
and other deficiencies in China's criminal laws violate TRIPS be-
cause they do not sufficiently deter future infringement.244 Per-
be available for any act of infringement, these laws do not mandate that all such con-
duct will, in fact, be prosecuted. The United States might argue that thresholds are
appropriate in the United States, but because of China's rampant piracy, may not be
appropriate for China. This would be unconvincing.
244. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 41, 61. Both TRIPS Article 41 and 61 refer to
the need to deter future infringement. While these two articles relate to different sanc-
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haps recognizing the difficulty with arguing that the specific
fines and terms of imprisonment are inadequate to sufficiently
deter future infringement, the United States argues a more
nuanced position. The United States argues that TRIPS Article
61 mandates that countries make remedies, including imprison-
ment and monetary fines, available sufficient to provide a deter-
rent. Because China's thresholds fail to capture certain cases of
willful trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a com-
mercial scale, China's measures do not at all provide for criminal
remedies for these cases, and thus neither make such remedies
available nor provide a deterrent.245 Accordingly, the United
States' argument hinges on how the panel defines "commercial
scale" and whether the panel will find that activity that currently
falls outside the thresholds constitutes commercial scale counter-
feiting and piracy. In view of the above discussion suggesting
that the panel will find that such activity does not fall within the
definition of commercial scale counterfeiting or piracy, the
United States will likely not be able to establish a prima facie
case that China's laws are inconsistent with Article 61's deter-
rence requirement.
The United States might also rely on the CCA Report to
support its position that China's criminal law thresholds fail to
deter future infringement. As the United States demonstrates,
the percentage of counterfeiters and pirates that fall outside the
thresholds remained constant despite the reduced liability
threshold. This suggests that the thresholds fail to deter and in-
stead serve as "guideposts for how to avoid the risk of criminal
prosecution. '24 6 In evaluating this argument, a WTO panel will
have to determine what constitutes a sufficient deterrent to fu-
ture infringements, perhaps looking at deterrence in general
and then to the CCA Report and China's enforcement efforts.247
tions, i.e., civil and criminal, for purposes of this analysis the two will be considered
together. See id.
245. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 166 ("China can not make the
necessary remedies available or sufficient to deter piracy and counterfeiting, when
many classes of commercial scale piracy and counterfeiting are not even subject to crim-
inal prosecution or conviction.").
246. U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 153.
247. See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 41, 61.
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a. Do Criminal Penalties Deter Future Infringement?
Whether criminal penalties deter crime is questionable.
While there are conflicting studies, countless studies have found
that stronger criminal laws have no deterrent effect. 24 8 While a
number of these studies involve different (yet comparable) con-
texts such as drugs and murder,249 others specifically address the
deterrent effects of stronger penalties in the intellectual prop-
erty context.25° For example, Professor Mark Schultz, discussing
increased penalties for copyright infringement, argues that the
reason deterrent-based strategies are ineffective is that it is very
difficult to convince infringers that they will be caught and pun-
ished:
To influence behavior, [people's] estimates [of the risk of
getting caught] need to be high enough to exceed some
248. See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent
Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003)
(suggesting that while capital punishment may have a strong deterrent effect, tougher
sentencing laws provide little to no deterrent effect);JohnJ. Donohue &Justin Wolfers,
The Ethics and Empirics of Capital Punishment: Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791 (2005) (the statistical studies addressing the
deterrent benefit of capital punishment are statistically insignificant and analysis is sus-
ceptible to economic factors, representing "profound uncertainty" as to the deterrent
effect); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus
Brutalization: Capital Punishment's Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203
(2005) (in the context of capital punishment, when capital punishment exists but is
rarely used, there is no deterrent effect and in some instances, increases crime); Carol
S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the
Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005); Symposium, Capital Punishment and Capital
Murder: Market Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1803
(2006) (when looking at the statistics only from the perspective of homicides punisha-
ble by capital punishment, no deterrent effect has been found). But cf Isaac Ehrlich,
The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 Am. ECON. REV.
397 (1975) (widely cited source for the argument that capital punishment deters mur-
der at a rate of each execution deterring eight murders); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs,
58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005) (statistical analysis that capital punishment has a powerful
impact and that failure to implement it has a direct, measurable impact on increased
deaths makes such punishment morally necessary). The conflicting studies more likely
lead us to question whether any strong conclusions could be drawn about deterrence.
249. See supra note 248 and accompanying text; see generally Robert J. MacCoun,
Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497
(1993) (deterrence effects on drug use).
250. See, e.g., Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can
Teach Us About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651
(2006); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective,
29 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1997).
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threshold of being psychologically meaningful. Typically,
neither the reality nor the perception of enforcement meets
this goal. Most laws are not enforced stringently enough to
create a strong deterrent effect. Compounding this difficulty
is the fact that people often underestimate their chance of
getting caught.
251
Simply put, most laws are not enforced stringently enough to
create a strong deterrent effect. 25 2 Schultz also notes the possi-
ble negative public fallout from such laws, observing that
"[d]rastically increasing penalties is unlikely to be a politically
viable strategy." 253 Moreover, as Tom Tyler recognizes, increas-
ing enforcement and penalties for intellectual property infringe-
ment will consume large amounts of public resources.254 With
many other issues competing for such resources, it is increas-
ingly difficult to argue the wisdom of using such resources for
intellectual property enforcement. Ultimately, both Tyler and
Schultz conclude that the most "effective way to persuade people
to comply with copyright law is to convince them that it is the
right thing to do."2 55
For this Article, a number of deterrence articles merit fur-
ther consideration: one involves criminalizing intellectual prop-
erty infringement in the United States; the other increasing
criminal penalties in China. Professor Eric Goldman analyzed
the effects of the "NET Act" that Congress passed in 1997 to de-
ter and punish U.S. copyright infringement (specifically, the ille-
gal copying and trading of software). The NET Act imposed im-
prisonment of one to six years for any violation. Despite the
criminalization of infringement and that a number of prosecu-
tions resulted, Goldman noted that the NET Act "has not con-
formed the behavior of traders or had any real effect on piracy
generally."256 Similar to Tyler and Schultz, Goldman argues that
infringers did not comply with the law because they did not be-
251. Schultz, supra note 250, at 663 (quoting COMM. TO REVIEW RESEARCH ON Po-
LICE POLICY AND PRACTICES, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 295
(Wesley G. Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004)).
252. See Schultz, supra note 250, at 663.
253. Id. at 664.
254. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 22-23 (1990).
255. Schultz, supra note 250, at 665.
256. Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal
Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REv. 369, 396 (2003).
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lieve in it.2 57
With regard to China, a recent article investigating the de-
terrent effect of China's stronger criminal penalties for robbery
found that China's stringent penalties, including the death pen-
alty, provided no deterrent effect despite the fact that penalties
for robbery are enforced regularly with many arrests and quick
prosecutions. 25' The study found that during the period of
stronger criminal penalties, rather than slow, economic property
crimes nearly quadrupled. 259 The study concluded that not only
did China's strict system fail as an effective deterrent, but that it
also diverted resources from preventative measures. 260 There is
thus an open question whether China's criminal penalties (or
any country's, for that matter) can deter future infringement.
Nonetheless, whether criminal penalties deter future crimes
is, in large part, beside the point. In mandating criminal penal-
ties for intellectual property rights violations, WTO members
necessarily concluded that criminal penalties do deter future in-
fringement. As such, a panel should be limited to resolving
whether China's stated thresholds have any deterrent effect and,
if so, at what point do the thresholds no longer have that effect.
Looking to the CCA Report and to enforcement statistics may
aid in determining whether thresholds have that deterrent ef-
fect. Here, we evaluate the United States' CCA Survey evidence
and also look at China's pre-TRIPS enforcement statistics when
no stated thresholds applied and its post-TRIPS enforcement sta-
tistics when thresholds applied.261 Based on these statistics, the
United States again may have a difficult time proving that spe-
cific thresholds or that lowering current thresholds will deter fu-
ture infringement.
b. CCA Report
The United States argues that the CCA Report demon-
strates that China's thresholds fail to deter future infringement.
Comparing administrative enforcement raids before and after
257. See id. at 409.
258. See generally Peter D. Nestor, Comment, Wen the Price is Too High: Rethinking
China's Deterrence Strategy for Robbery, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'YJ. 525 (2007).
259. Id. at 526.
260. Id. at 540-41.
261. A further meaningful comparison would include statistics after China further
reduced the thresholds. These statistics, however, are too recent and not available.
[Vol. 32:96
THE HONEYMOON IS OVER
the April 2007 Judicial Interpretation, which reduced the copy
thresholds for criminal penalties from 1000 to .500, the United
States demonstrates that the amount of activity that fell below
the relevant thresholds remained the same, despite the lowered
limit.26 2 Both before and after the changed thresholds, more
than eighty-two percent of all administrative enforcement raids
fell below the thresholds.263 While compelling, this does not in-
escapably lead to the suggested conclusion.
Instead, a more detailed inquiry must be made into how
many of the post-April 2007Judicial Interpretations were already
below the lowered 500-infringing-copy threshold. That is, if the
majority of the infringers that were found to keep inventory be-
tween zero to 999 infringing copies actually kept that inventory
within zero to 499 infringing copies, then the lowered threshold
would, of course, result in no change in the percentage below
the threshold. Even accepting the United States' position, the
real problem may lie with China's enforcement efforts rather
than in the perceived weakness of its laws.
c. China's Pre-TRIPS Enforcement
China's State Administration of Industry and Commerce
("SAIC") is primarily responsible for enforcing trademarks. It
provided the following statistics for penalties between 1997 and
2000.264
Year Cases Avg Fine Avg Damages Criminal Prosecutions
1997 15,321 [US]$679 [US]$40 57 total or 1 in 268 cases
1998 14,216 [US]$699 [US]$41 35 total or 1 in 406 cases
1999 16,938 [US]$754 [US]$40 21 total or 1 in 806 cases
2000 22,001 [US]$794 [US]$19 45 total or 1 in 489 cases
These statistics are deplorable. However, the statistics are note-
worthy in that they reflect China's efforts before it acceded to
TRIPS in 2001.265 Thus, the statistics provide meaningful com-
262. See U.S. First Submission, supra note 97, 160.
263. Id. 161.
264. CHOW AND LEE, supra note 5, at 789 (citing State Administration of Industry
and Commerce ("SAIC") of the People's Republic of China, Annual Statistics).
265. See MERTHA, supra note 67, at 203-04 (noting that in 2002 only about 2.5% of
all trademark-violating cases were prosecuted under China's Criminal Code. In addi-
2008]
162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
parisons to China's post-TRIPS enforcement.
d. China's Post-TRIPS Enforcement
Three years after acceding to the WTO and TRIPS, in 2004,
the Supreme Court of China issued its first Judicial Interpreta-
tion setting specific thresholds. That year, Chinese courts heard
almost 8400 civil cases but only 385 criminal trademark infringe-
ment cases.2 66 More troubling, Chinese administrative agencies
referred only ninety-six cases for criminal prosecutions out of
51,851 trademark infringing cases that the agencies handled,
even though the almost 52,000 cases resulted in the seizure and
destruction of over forty million counterfeit goods. 267 Further-
more, according to data that China provided in response to U.S.
requests, in 2004, China's criminal copyright prosecution fared
no better-China filed no cases under Article 218 and only thir-
teen cases under Article 217.268
China's criminal enforcement efforts in 2005 were similarly
anemic. That year, SAIC indicated that less than 0.3% of the
total trademark cases were prosecuted as criminal offenses.269
Chinese prosecutors initiated six cases in 2005 under Article 218,
and twenty-eight cases under Article 217.270 As for trademark
counterfeiting, China prosecuted ninety-eight cases in 2005
tion, only one out of ten cases which could have been handled by the criminal court
actually were). The author does offer hope for optimism as he states that the number
of criminal cases has begun to increase, "slowly but steadily." Id. at 203. He also ex-
plains that "[e]ven though the actual number of cases currently appears infinitesimal,
when seen against a baseline of even three years earlier, it appears significant." Id. at
206.
266. See Cedric Lam, China & Hong Kong: Recent Developments in Intellectual Property,
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/06AP/314_317.htm.
267. See id. ("China has two routes for enforcing intellectual property rights: judi-
cial proceedings and administrative actions."). The administrative remedy remains the
most popular route for enforcing intellectual property rights in China. However, "[i]n
July 2005, the People's Procuratorate issued a draft regulation directing administrative
bodies to refer IP violations promptly to criminal authorities for prosecution when a
case meets the prescribed standards for criminal prosecution." Id. One possible expla-
nation for the statistical disparities is the lack of qualified judges, government agents
and lawyers. China has been addressing this problem over the last decade. See generally
SHENKAR, supra note 22, at 60.
268. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 18 n.1, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports
Publications/2006/2006_Special_301 Review/asset-upload_file473_9336.pdf.
269. See id.
270. See id.
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under Article 215.271 These statistics demonstrate that China's
post-TRIPS criminal enforcement efforts have been no better
than its pre-TRIPS criminal enforcement efforts despite the clar-
ification of the criminal laws and the introduction of stated
thresholds. There are two ways to view this. For one, the statis-
tics might substantiate the United States' allegations that the
thresholds are still not low enough to capture the rampant com-
mercial scale piracy that continues to plague China and is sub-
ject to criminal prosecution. It also substantiates the claim that
the laws do not by any measure deter infringement and must be
strengthened. By further lowering the thresholds, as the United
States desires, the Chinese government can better prosecute
these serious infringers and deter future infringement. The sec-
ond, more plausible view, is that these statistics indicate that
thresholds are not the problem-enforcement is.
A comparison to the United States' enforcement statistics
supports the view that thresholds are not the problem.272 As in
China, in the United States, criminal actions against intellectual
property rights infringers represent a small fraction of the over-
all intellectual property rights enforcement. Recall, in 2002,
compared to over 8200 civil cases filed, only 405 intellectual
property criminal cases were referred to government authorities,
of which only 134 cases were sentenced for criminal intellectual
property offenses.273 Presumably, the United States complies
with its TRIPS obligations.274 Yet, these criminal enforcement
statistics suggest a less than reassuring answer that thresholds are
the problem. While the statistics do not indicate how many of
the criminal cases were felonies-thus, exceeding the ten copy
threshold-even in the implausible event that all of the cases
were felony cases the numbers do not paint a flattering picture.
If the United States' criminal intellectual property laws comply
with TRIPS, similar-and arguably even less effective-criminal
271. See id.
272. Of course, other than threshold limits, many other factors come into play
here, such as available resources, local culture, and other available remedies and penal-
ties. Nonetheless, the threshold limit might play a role, and for the United States to
prevail on its claim, it must demonstrate that thresholds play a role.
273. ABBOYr ET AL., supra note 86, at 614 (citing to UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: Intellectual Property Theft, 2002 (2004),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iptO2.pdf). Of those convicted, less
than half received prison time. See id.
274. See id.
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intellectual property laws will also comply with TRIPS. China's
criminal laws may fit that bill.
e. Crimes of a "Corresponding Gravity"
As a final refutation to the United States' lack of deterrence
claim, China can point to Article 61's prescription that Member
Countries make remedies available sufficient to provide a deter-
rent "consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of
a corresponding gravity. ' 275 Two possible crimes of a corre-
sponding gravity come to mind: fraud and theft. Looking to
China's fraud and theft provisions, a panel could find China's
thresholds are appropriate.
i. Fraud
China's fraud and theft criminal provisions use the same
vague language as that used in its intellectual property criminal
provisions. For example, under China's Criminal Code Article
266, a person commits a fraud when that person swindles a rela-
tively large amount of public or private property.27 6 The penal-
ties for fraud are also similar-a prison sentence of not more
than three years, concurrently with or independently of a fine.
If the amount involved is "very large" or "the circumstances are
serious," the offender faces a prison sentence of between three
and ten years. If the amount involved is "exceptionally large" or
"the circumstances are extremely serious," the offender faces a
"fixed-term imprisonment of not less than ten years, life impris-
onment, and may in addition include a fine or confiscation of
property., 277
ii. Theft
The language used in China's Criminal Code theft provi-
sion is similar. Article 264 provides that "[a] nyone who steals a
relatively large amount of public or private money and property
shall be sentenced to [a] fixed-term imprisonment of not more
than three years, criminal detention or public surveillance, and
may in addition or exclusively be subject to a fine. 2 7 8 If the
275. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 61.
276. See Criminal Code, § 266 (P.R.C.).
277. See id.
278. Id. § 264.
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amount involved is "very large" and the "circumstances are seri-
ous," the offender faces a prison term between three and ten
years. Finally, if the amount involved is "exceptionally large"
and the "circumstances are extremely serious," the offender
shall be sentenced to a fixed-term imprisonment of not less than
ten years or life imprisonment. The theft provision is different
from both the fraud and the intellectual property criminal provi-
sions in one important respect: theft carries the possibility of a
death sentence. A person is subject to life imprisonment or
death if the person steals property from a financial institution
and obtains an "exceptionally large amount" of property, or
steals rare and precious cultural relics with serious circum-
stances.
2 7 9
While the theft and fraud provisions do not have compara-
ble Judicial Interpretations that define "huge, serious circum-
stances," etc., China can nonetheless rely on these provisions to
argue that its intellectual property laws comply with Article 61 as
they are comparable to the penalties applied to "crimes of a cor-
responding gravity." 280
B. Negative Consequences of Filing the Complaint
Without question, IPRs enforcement represents a critical is-
sue in the U.S.-China relationship. The numerous agreements
and contentious negotiations involving IPRs enforcement reflect
this. But the filing of the complaint goes beyond the merits of
the IPRs dispute. Indeed, independent of the legal analysis,
279. See id. § 264. Article 267 provides similar penalties:
Anyone who loots public property, where the amount involved is relatively
large, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three
years, criminal detention or public surveillance, and may in addition or exclu-
sive be subject to a fine. If the amount involved is very large or the circum-
stances are serious, the sentence shall be fixed-term imprisonment of not less
than three years and not more than ten years, and may in addition include a
fine. If the amount involved is exceptionally large or the circumstances are
extremely serious, the sentence shall be fixed term imprisonment of not less
than ten years, life imprisonment, and may in addition include a fine or con-
fiscation of property.
Id. § 267.
280. Of course, if the penalties for theft and fraud do not serve as a deterrent,
then it is not clear whether similar penalties will serve as a deterrent for counterfeiting
and piracy. As mentioned earlier, at least one China-specific study found that strong
criminal penalties do not serve as a deterrent in robbery cases. This may hold true for
theft, fraud, and intellectual property crimes.
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other important considerations come into play. The next Sec-
tion examines the negative implications of the complaint and
the countervailing motivations beyond IPRs enforcement that
likely drive the dispute. It is likely that these other considera-
tions heavily influenced the United States' decision.
1. No Guarantee That United States Will Prevail
An important consideration in the detailed and prolonged
negotiations with China over IPR enforcement was the United
States' obvious interest in resolving the matter without resort to
the WTO dispute settlement process. There are a number of
reasons why the United States would refrain from initiating a
WTO complaint against China. For one, there is the possibility
that the United States will not prevail, as discussed above. The
United States has brought eighteen TRIPS complaints, only a
handful against developing countries, 28 ' and only three specifi-
cally targeting lack of enforcement-all against Western trading
partners, none of which have gone to a panel or Appellate Body
decision.282 Thus, there is no precedent upon which to evaluate
the current U.S. complaint. However, as discussed above, TRIPS
provides considerable flexibility to countries in implementing
their TRIPS obligations, including those relating to enforce-
ment.2 3 This favors China and counsels against filing the com-
plaint.
Second, even if the United States were to win a favorable
WTO ruling, it is not clear what the United States would gain.
The WTO complaint alleges that China's thresholds for trigger-
281. One reason for the lack of complaints against developing countries is that
TRIPS delays compliance with its terms for developing and least developing countries
for five and ten years, respectively. The deadlines for least developing countries have
been further extended another ten years. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Question about Trips,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/tfipfqe.
htm#Who'sSigned (last visited Nov. 18, 2008).
282. See, e.g., Requests for the Consultations by the United States, European Commu-
nities-Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictures and Television Programs,
WT/DS124/1 (May 7, 1998); Requests for the Consultations by the United States,
Greece-Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights for Motion Pictuers and Television Pictures,
'WT/DS125/1 (May 7, 1998); Requests for the Consultations by the United States, Swe-
den-Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS86/1 (june 2,
1997); Requests for the Consultations by the United States, Denmark-Measures Affecting
the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTrr/DS83/1 (June 13, 2001).
283. Precedent, even though not formally a binding basis for future cases (i.e., no
stare decisis), remains highly persuasive.
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ing criminal penalties for IP infringement are too high. 284 The
problem with China's lack of enforcement, however, is not that
China has failed to enact legislation strengthening intellectual
property rights; it is that China does not enforce such legislation.
As shown, only a fraction of the total number of enforcement
actions that could be brought under the current criminal statute
are actually brought. Thus, there is no guarantee that a success-
ful WTO complaint will result in more criminal complaints and
prosecutions. Rather, lower thresholds from a successful com-
plaint must be accompanied by some measure of mandatory
criminal prosecutions. Thus, reducing the threshold for crimi-
nal prosecution is not likely to make a significant difference. 8 5
In light of this, it is puzzling that the United States has limited its
claims against China in a manner seeking further legislation
without seeking concomitant enforcement.
Moreover, the primary reason for China's lack of enforce-
ment is that enforcement occurs at the local level-not the na-
tional level-and local enforcement officials are reluctant to
shut down piracy. Officials are reluctant because piracy has a
positive effect on local economy and shutting down piracy would
significantly adversely affect the entire local economy. Legiti-
mate businesses, including hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, and
transport businesses, among others, have arisen to support
China's piracy industry. In addition, the China Small Commodi-
ties Market, of which the piracy industries are a part, is the
town's largest taxpayer. Cracking down on piracy will disrupt
this local economy and could result in massive unemployment
and social strife and turmoil. Chow and Lee forcefully make this
point:
No problem of this size and scope could exist without the di-
rect or indirect involvement of the state. In China, the na-
tional government in Beijing appears to be sincere in its rec-
ognition of the importance of protecting intellectual prop-
284. See infra Part IL.A.4.
285. See Mertha, supra note 67, at 209. The ultimate goal may be the default
criminalization of counterfeiting, but even this suffers from the need to rely on aggres-
sive enforcement by Chinese officials. One suggestion for a more effective remedy is a
mandatory criminal penalty in certain situations. On the other hand, rather than en-
courage intellectual property enforcement or deter future infringement, "increased
criminalization of counterfeiting could create a situation where punishments would go
far beyond establishing the sought after deterrent effect and become a tool for repres-
sion." Id. at 208 n.141.
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erty rights, but national level authorities are policy and law-
making bodies whereas enforcement occurs on the ground at
the local level. At this level, local governments are either di-
rectly or indirectly involved in supporting the trade in coun-
terfeit goods. Counterfeit has become so important that this
illegal trade now supports entire local economies and a crack-
down on counterfeiting would result in a shut-down of the
local economy with all of the attendant costs of unemploy-
ment, dislocation, social turmoil, and chaos. Because the
costs of a crackdown at the local level can be so severe, coun-
terfeiting is heavily defended at local levels. 286
Clearly, simply changing the threshold for criminal complaints is
unlikely to result in a change in local officials' attitudes concern-
ing intellectual property protection.28 7
2. The Filing Could Impede China's Efforts to
Change Domestic Attitudes
Additionally, by bringing the complaint, the United States
may impede China's efforts to convince Chinese citizens that
protecting intellectual property is in the country's best inter-
ests.2 "s Along with the obvious economic benefits attained by
becoming a WTO member, China's decision to become a mem-
ber was motivated by China's desire to introduce external pres-
sures to help overcome internal obstacles, including social un-
rest, in the reform process.289 Simply put, a necessary condition
for China to accept stronger intellectual property rights is that
Chinese citizens and local businesses must be convinced that
protection is good for domestic interests. Before now, this has
been difficult, in view of the lack of credible evidence supporting
this.2 0
286. CHOW AND LEE, supra note 5, at 774.
287. Mertha's comments here are particularly appropriate: "Top-down pressure
can result in dramatic, substantive changes in China's legislative, regulating and poli-
cymaking processes, but this same form of pressure has little, if any, sustained effect on
the implementation and enforcement stages." Mertha, supra note 67, at 225.
288. In light of China's political system, some may legitimately debate whether the
Chinese government feels it has to convince its citizens of anything. Instead, it may be
more accurate to state that advocates of stronger IPR enforcement must convince Com-
munist hardliners and corrupt local officials that it is in these parties' best interest to
protect intellectual property rights. This may be a difficult proposition.
289. Julia Ya Qin, The Impact of WFO Accession on China's Legal System: Trade, Invest-
ment and Beyond, http://ssrn.com/abstract=985321.
290. Scholars have argued for increased intellectual property protection on a num-
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Further exacerbating the difficulty, China's citizens have
traditionally viewed intellectual property protection negatively,
as strong intellectual property protection runs counter to
China's cultural and historical underpinnings and Communist
ideals.291 Strong IPRs protection, particularly exerted by exoge-
nous pressures, fuels the flames of anti-American sentiment.
China's hostile attitude towards U.S. imperialism and the trans-
planting of Western ideals is worsened with each U.S. threat to
retaliate for China's failure to enforce intellectual property laws.
Despite this, over the past decade, China's Central Administra-
tion has made significant efforts to persuade the country that the
WTO (including TRIPS) is good for China's economy. 29 2 Many
efforts to improve IPRs protection have come from within,
rather than from foreign pressures. Businesses and government
have focused on "knowledge economy" as an attempt to incorpo-
rate information into the long-term economic development. 293
The growth of legitimate intellectual property stakeholders in
China, largely with governmental assistance, has allowed the Chi-
nese government to emphasize that IPRs provide protection for
her of grounds, including (1) that such protection is based on the "natural rights" of a
creator to the fruits of one's labor; (2) that increased protection will result in future
benefits such as creating a culture or ideology of protection for local emerging artists;
and (3) that increased protection will result in increased technology transfer and for-
eign direct investment. See, e.g., RobertJ. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellec-
tual Property and International Trade in the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match
Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 713, 715-16 (1999); Frederick M. Abbott, The New
Global Technology Regime: The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 385, 391 (1996); Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the Intellectual
Property Protection Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other When We Say
"Property?" A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSAJ. Int'l & Comp. L. 307,
321-30 (1996). These justifications have been severely criticized. See, e.g., Martin Kohr,
How the South is Getting a Raw Deal at the WTO, in VIEwS FROM THE SOUTH, THE EFFECTS
OF GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO ON THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 22 (2000); Marci Hamil-
ton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 613 (1996); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Eco-
nomic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).
291. See supra Part I.B.
292. Quite obviously, China has benefited greatly from "ATO membership. How-
ever, despite enormous growth, China is experiencing serious employment problems
and social unrest as a result of its economic reform. See Harpaz, supra note 2, at 68; see
also Eric Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 CAL. L. REv. 957, 969-70
(2005) (questioning whether countries join the AITO for the benefits of the adjudica-
tory system themselves or for the substantive benefits of the particular treaty regime).
293. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story of Chinese Intellectual Property
Rights, http://www.peteryu.com/sweetsour.pdf.
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Chinese businesses, not just foreign businesses. 29 4 The govern-
ment also provided resources to educate the public, including
online resources of current IPRs cases and theories, and how
China can and does comply with its TRIPS obligations. 295 These
efforts reinforce the contention that the benefits from WTO
membership justify stronger IPRs enforcement. Importantly,
these efforts have resulted in slow but gradual recognition by
Chinese citizens of the benefits of WIG participation. 296 Avoid-
ing setbacks in this area is essential to China's full acceptance of
and compliance with its WTO obligations. The United States'
WTO complaint threatens to undermine this.
3. China may be Meeting its WTO Obligations
More directly related to the United States' charges is that
China may already be meeting its TRIPS obligations. China has
passed an impressive array of laws to comply with TRIPS. These
laws were passed after extensive negotiation and careful review
and, on their face, appear to comply with both the spirit and
letter of TRIPS. Moreover, because TRIPS provides a considera-
ble amount of flexibility to members, China's IP legislation may
be TRIPS compliant. A number of commentators concur.29 7
Further, China's recent WTO ascension and its membership
in WIPO signify its commitment to adhere to international intel-
lectual property norms, as it continues to reform and modernize
its economy. The United States' complaint addresses what it be-
lieves to be specific deficiencies in Chinese national law regard-
ing enforcement of intellectual property rights and is a direct
indictment of China's ability to live up to agreed international
norms. 29 8 Even assuming that China is not complying with its
294. Id. at 7-8.
295. See generally Robert Slate, judicial Copyright Enforcement in China: Shaping World
Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 665 (2006).
296. Massey, supra note 31, at 237.
297. See, e.g., Harpaz, supra note 2, at 46 ("Although a discussion of the issue of
compliance is beyond the scope of this paper, it appears to me that overall China is
meeting its WT'O commitments. A close look at the USTR's 2005 Report to Congress on
China's WfO Compliance, demonstrates, in my view, that China is generally complying
with its WTO commitments, though there are a number of problems, particularly re-
garding Intellectual Property Rights, which I consider to be a minor infraction.") (cit-
ing OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATrVE, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S
INTO COMPLIANCE, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports_Publica-
tions/2005/asset-upload file293_8580.pdf).
298. See generally Consultations, supra note 79.
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WTO obligations, strong reasons exist for allowing China addi-
tional time to comply.
China's current level of economic development may not be
appropriate for the level of intellectual property protection de-
sired by the United States. The extent of both piracy and intel-
lectual property protection depends upon a country's stage of
economic development. More specifically, a country's economic
development level alters the cost-benefit ratio of protecting intel-
lectual property. As a country progresses, it will pass through at
least three stages of economic development, with each stage
presenting a different cost-benefit scenario for IPRs protec-
tion.2 9 9 The first stage is a very low level of economic develop-
ment, wherein a country has little technological capacity and in-
frastructure such that intellectual property protection would be
irrational; these countries would not have the ability to utilize
technology in a meaningful manner. 00 The second stage of eco-
nomic development is that in which a country has the markets
and infrastructure necessary for innovation, but has certain limi-
tations. These countries, because they are capable of using more
advanced technology, become intellectual property pirates.'
Here, again, protection of intellectual property is not para-
mount because such protection interferes with continued eco-
nomic progress. The third stage is that in which a country has
an advanced level of economic development, with businesses
that create world-class inventions providing the country with a
significant competitive advantage.30 2 These countries not only
demand increased protection domestically, but also seek in-
creased protection worldwide. Scholars argue that a country in
the first and second stages of economic development should be
protected from economic damage and be allowed to promote
development until the country reaches the stage where it is in
the country's best interest to strengthen its intellectual property
laws. 303
299. See generally Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Coun-
tries: US Effort to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.
REV. 569 (1993).
300. See id. at 596.
301. See id. at 597.
302. See id.
303. See generally id.; CHow AND LEE, supra note 5, at 777; COMMISSION ON INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 22 (2003),
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This sentiment is echoed by the Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights, an international commission set up by the Brit-
ish government to explore how national intellectual property re-
gimes could best be designed to benefit developing countries
within the context of international agreements such as TRIPS.
30 4
In its final report, the Commission cautioned:
[R]apid economic growth is more often associated with
weaker IP protection. In technologically advanced develop-
ing countries, there is some evidence that IP protection be-
comes important at a stage of development, but that stage is
not until a country is well into the category of upper middle
income developing countries.30 5
Chow and Lee make a similar point:
If history is any guide, most nations appear to experience a
surge in commercial piracy at some point in their history
when they reach a certain stage of economic development.
The United States was the leading pirate nation of the day in
the nineteenth century as copies of books by Charles Dickens
and other foreign authors were made available in the [United
States] without payment of royalties.30 6
In light of this, these authors ask: "Why shouldn't China have the
same opportunity to accelerate its economic growth . . . ?3
China's economic development, as supported by its legal
system, is still in its early stages of development (perhaps the sec-
ond stage outlined above). China dismantled its legal system
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and only recently
(1978) resuscitated the system. As such, it will take time for
China's system to make progress and operate at its optimal level.
During this time, piracy will exist. Indeed, every country that has
seen substantial economic and technological growth, including
the United States, has done so in part through piracy.3 8 Al-
lowing China additional time to progress to a stage in which pro-
tection is warranted, both externally and internally, may be fit-
available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfulfinal.
pdf [hereinafter CIPR REPORT].
304. See CIPR REPORT, supra note 303, at 22.
305. See id. at 22.
306. CHOW AND LEE, supra note 5, at 777 (citing SHENKAR, supra note 22, at 82).
307. See id. at 777-78.
308. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 41, at 175.
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4. The Complaint Could Trigger Chinese
Retaliation or Trade Wars
There are at least two final reasons why the United States
should not have filed the WTO complaint. One is related to re-
taliation, the other to a preferred mode of resolving complaints.
Filing the WTO complaint could result in resentment, which in
turn could result in Chinese retaliation or the escalation of trade
wars. In fact, recently, the United States and China have nar-
rowly averted a series of trade wars and economic sanctions over
intellectual property infringement. 31 ° Since the United States
309. Professor Peter Yu suggests that China is not far from a "crossover point," i.e.,
moving from the second to the third stage of economic development. Id. at 202. He
identifies two primary crossover motivators spurring China towards intellectual prop-
erty enforcement reform. The first is external pressure from the United States. The
second is the development of local stakeholders who benefit from stronger protection.
As Yu argues, these motivators, combined with other motivating forces such as China's
desire to develop a knowledge-based economy, China's economic and reputational
gains due to its WTO accession, and China's shift toward an export-driven economy,
will naturally and before long lead China to reach the point where intellectual property
protection will become of primary importance. See id. at 176; see also Abbott, supra note
143, at 74-75 (observing that China is likely to strengthen intellectual property rights
enforcement when local stakeholders increase their attention to innovation and brand-
ing). It was hoped the Beijing Olympics would provide further incentives: "As China
continues to increase exports and develop products under globally recognized trade-
marks, especially after the much-anticipated push around the 2008 Beijing Olympics
(and again during the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai), the existence of effective intel-
lectual property protection is likely to be of paramount importance." Yu, China Puzzle,
supra note 41, at 202.
310. Since China's early economic emergence in the 1970s, the United States and
China have engaged in a series of back-and-forth disagreements over intellectual prop-
erty. In one of the earlier disputes, China agreed to protect U.S. patent and trademark
rights with the same level of protection as U.S. intellectual property protection. See
Bird, supra note 69, at 339 (citing the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China of 1979,July 7, 1979, U.S.-
P.R.C, 31 U.S.T. 4652). China modified its laws, but dissatisfied, in 1989 the United
States placed China on its Priority Watch List. Id. at 339-40. Once again, China enacted
new intellectual property laws. Once again, frustrated, in 1991 the United States desig-
nated China as a Priority Foreign Country, threatening US$1.5 billion in retaliatory
tariffs. See id. at 340 (explaining that the United States threatened tariffs on Chinese
textiles, shoes, electronics, and pharmaceuticals). China was predictably hostile.
Rather than bow to the U.S. pressure, China threatened its own tariffs on aircraft,
chemicals, steel, and agricultural goods. The series of events ended in a negotiated
settlement-the Memorandum of Understanding on January 17, 1992-avoiding a
trade war. See id. As described previously, following the 1992 agreement China made
substantial and significant changes to its intellectual property laws. See supra Part I.C.1;
see also Bird, supra note 69, at 341 ("Within the three-year period from the adoption of
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filed its IPR enforcement complaint against China, China has
filed a countervailing duty/anti-dumping complaint against the
United States, and on March 5, 2008, the United States filed yet
another complaint against China for violating obligations in the
financial sector under GATS. 11 The United States may very well
lose in a trade war, as China may be less reliant on U.S. exports
than the United States on Chinese exports.312 In some ways,
China holds the United States' economic fate in its hands. At
the very least, China is able to put equal or greater economic
pressure on the United States.
Also, importantly, trade retaliation can damage China's
economy and delay further economic and technological devel-
opment, preventing it from reaching a level where intellectual
the 1992 MOU China improved its intellectual property protection on all fronts.").
However, throughout the 1990's it became clear that, despite substantive changes to its
laws, China's enforcement of IPRs was severely deficient. See id. In 1994 the USTR
again designated China as a Priority Foreign Country and the Clinton Administration
threatened tariffs on US$1 billion worth of Chinese imports. See id. Again, China retali-
ated by threatening tariffs of its own as well as suspending negotiations on potential
joint-ventures with U.S. automakers. See id. In light of the competing threats, the coun-
tries negotiated a settlement. Id. at 342; see supra Part I.C.2. The cycle repeated itself in
1995 and 1996, and after a period of threatened sanctions, the United States and China
reached an agreement in which the United States would remove China from its Special
301 list in return for China's improved enforcement of IPRs. Bird, supra note 69, at 342.
The cycle of threatened retaliation was broken in the late 1990's as China pushed for
entry to the WTO. Bird dubbed this the China Cycle of Coercion. Bird, supra note 69,
at 343. Peter Yu more aptly described this as the "cycle of futility." Yu, supra note 41.
Whatever it is called, the United States was not able to obtain its objectives, largely
because of the Chinese economy's rapid growth and the diminished prestige of U.S.
foreign policy.
311. Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting Finan-
cial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS373/1 (Mar. 5,
2008).
312. See Keith Bradsher, China Leans Less on U.S. Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007,
at 1 ("To be sure, China's exports to the United States are huge and growing, as is the
trade imbalance, which is significantly larger than the European Union's deficit with
China. That is the main reason trade is a focus of attention for the newly empowered
Democrats in Congress, making it likely that trade frictions between the two countries
will persist and possibly worsen in the months ahead."); see also Yu, supra note 41, at 198.
One commentator has argued that China may retaliate by attempting to recoup losses
in other areas, which will not be in China-or the WTO's-long term interests. Chris-
topher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Implement World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 399, 481-82 (2002)
("[S] purned by having to respond to a large number of TRIPs disputes, China could
attempt to use the DSU's retaliation or cross-retaliation enforcement mechanisms to
legitimize its own non-compliance in the event that China successfully challenges an-
other Member. This possibility is clearly not in the best long-term interests of either
China or the WTO.") (citation omitted).
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property protection becomes beneficial. 1 The acrimonious
U.S.-China relationship could decelerate China's intellectual
property reform.3" 4
5. Negotiation and Diplomacy may be More Effective than
Resort to the WTO Dispute Settlement Process
Finally, the United States' filing of the WTO complaint may
hinder the chances for both countries to resolve their dispute
through negotiation and diplomacy. Understandably, the WTO
dispute settlement agreement elevates informal settlement over
formal dispute resolution. Article 3(7) of the DSU states: "A so-
lution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consis-
tent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. 31 5
Some U.S. diplomats recognize that such informal attempts are
more likely to lead to an amicable resolution, as they lead to
decreased rather than increased tensions. U.S. Treasury Secre-
tary Henry Paulson's comment regarding the need for discus-
sion rather than litigation is illustrative:
The task of the SED [Strategic Economic Dialogue] is long-
term, and that is difficult in a town where short-termism is the
order of the day. A newspaper headline at the conclusion of
the recent SED meeting said that it did not "resolve major
issues." This, in my opinion, misses the point. The dialogue
is an on-going process. To get results, we must build relation-
ships, and take smaller, deliberate steps forward together to
create momentum for greater change. Through candid dis-
cussions, we will ease, rather than increase, tensions and get
to solutions and action.31 6
The complaint could harden stances on both sides making reso-
lution problematic (even if prior negotiations produced slow re-
sults).
In sum, the United States' WTO complaint could go awry
313. Kirchanski, supra note 299, at 605.
314. See Bird, supra note 69, 339-44. Another important consideration is the effect
the complaint will have on the legitimacy and efficacy of TRIPS and the W 1O. Argua-
bly, there is more riding on how a WTO panel will resolve the dispute than simply the
implications for China and the United States.
315. DSU, supra note 153, art. 3(7).
316. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Remark at the
Heritage Foundation Lee Lecture: China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue (June
5, 2007) (emphasizing the need for precise, measured steps appropriate for trade talks,
not sweeping solutions).
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and slow China's legal reform process, such as what occurred
during China's WTO accession, when intellectual property rights
reform slowed as China encountered obstacles from negotia-
tions with the United States and the European Union.31 7 This
was overcome through continued negotiations and China's reali-
zation that a commitment to strengthening intellectual property
rights and WTO accession begat economic benefits and reputa-
318tional gains.
C. Reasons Underlying the Filing of the WTO Complaint
In light of the myriad reasons for the United States to re-
frain from initiating a WTO complaint, the United States' action
is questionable. Compounding this is the basis of the complaint.
As seen, the complaint does not address the lack of enforce-
ment, as many scholars believed was the more immediate con-
cern. 3 1 9 Rather, the complaint addresses the lack of effective
legislation. Accordingly, the filing of the complaint could be
viewed as a strategic error. However, a number of reasons may
explain the United States' action, and tempting as it may be to
view the issue of IPR enforcement in isolation, this would be a
mistake." z The reality is that more than China's lack of intellec-
tual property enforcement fuels the United States' action. In ex-
amining these reasons, it is instructive to briefly review the his-
tory of the United States' use of the international dispute settle-
ment system, including the WTO dispute settlement system.
This history sheds light on the United States' current use of the
WNTO dispute settlement system, including the filing of the com-
plaint.
317. See Yu, supra note 41, at 196 (quoting Hong Xue & Chengsi Zheng, CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY xxxix (2002)). Professor Yu remarks
that "[i]t would not be too far-fetched to argue that China might still remain outside
the WTO had it not strengthened its protection of intellectual property rights." Id. at
196.
318. Id. at 196-97 ("To some extent, the economic benefits and reputational gains
that were associated with China's accession to the WTO far exceeded the socioeco-
nomic costs incurred by increased intellectual property protection.").
319. See Thomas E. Volper, Note, TRIPS Enforcement in China: A Case for Judicial
Transparency, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 339 (2007) (noting that the U.S. approach is
ineffective because it "[f] ocuses primarily on lack of criminal enforcement .... ").
320. This is not to suggest that IPR enforcement is not a key issue. China's non-
compliance reportedly costs the United States upward of US$200 billion annually. See
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: AN AFFIRMATIVE AGENDA, A
RESPONSIBLE COURSE 57 (2007). It is merely that other factors are clearly at play.
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1. "Pragmatic, Short-term and Highly Contextual Calculations"
In a recent article, Professor Jeffrey Dunoff argued that the
United States pursues WTO remedies not for an abstract com-
mitment to the rule of law, but to pursue specific economic and
geostrategic interests.12 1 In helping to explain the United States'
current use of the WTO dispute settlement system, Dunoff ex-
amined the history of the United States' participation in and use
of existing international dispute settlement systems. 22 Dunoff
traced the U.S. trading system from its birth, when trade, subject
to "interest-group politics," was largely a national, domestic con-
cern, through the growth of the United States' involvement in a
bilateral and, ultimately, the multilateral trading system. 23 Early
bilateral agreements did not contemplate legalized dispute set-
tlement, but instead demonstrated a desire to settle disputes
through voluntary consultations, under the belief that economic
disputes could be better addressed through diplomatic rather
than legalistic mechanisms.3 24  When, however, the United
States turned to the international trade dispute settlement sys-
tem, in almost every instance it did so because of domestic pres-
sures or "pragmatic, short-term and highly contextual calcula-
tions that [the dispute settlement] mechanism serve[d] U.S. in-
terests better than alternative arrangements. 3 25  By using the
321. See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does the U.S. Support International Tribunals? The
Case of the Multilateral Trade System, in THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS (Cesare Romano ed., forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=984294 ("To the extent adjudication of trade disputes is seen as advancing
U.S. economic interests, it is likely that the United States will continue to support legal-
ized dispute settlement."); see also Nzelibe, supra note 54, at 3 ("[Mlember states oper-
ate in an institutional and political context in which the purported benefits of an action
outweighs its costs.").
322. See generally Dunoff, supra note 321.
323. Id. at 2-3. Dunoff noted that during the nineteenth century, the benefits of a
liberal approach to trade were felt by a diffuse population, while the well-organized,
concentrated interest groups were disadvantaged by liberalization. As a result, these
organized groups had a disproportionate influence in national policy. This protection-
ist approach continued through the 1930s. The 1930 Smoot-Hawley legislation impos-
ing high import duties resulted in parallel protectionism in other countries. "In short
order, Canada, Cuba, France, Mexico, Italy, Spain, Australia and New Zealand all raised
their tariffs; twenty-six states imposed quotas and exchange controls by 1931; and the
United Kingdom abandoned liberalized trade the following year." Id.
324. Id. at 5 ("The underlying premise-apparently widely accepted at the time-
was that economic disputes could be better addressed through diplomatic rather than
legalistic mechanisms.").
325. Id. at 1.
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system, U.S. trade officials mediated pressures exerted by both
foreign trade officials and domestic political actors.3 26  Con-
versely, viewing the dispute settlement mechanism in instrumen-
tal terms, when highly legalized processes were perceived to
threaten United States' interests, the United States' use of the
settlement mechanism differed-the United States neither advo-
cated for nor participated in these legalized dispute settlement
mechanisms.
3 27
The United States' WTO complaint against China bears out
Professor Dunoff's observations. It is more than championing
the rule of law or general U.S. dissatisfaction that is fueling ac-
tion against China. 28 It is the United States' specific relation-
ship and dissatisfaction with China. More particularly, the an-
swer lies in a broad analysis of both the current international
326. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the United States pushed to create an interna-
tional trade organization, ultimately leading to the General Agreement and Trade Tar-
iffs ("GATT"). The dispute resolution procedure adopted, while international, closely
resembled proposals submitted by the United States. Id. at 11 (the GATT was "an ex-
pression of American policy."). The GATT followed the failure of the International
Trade Organization ("ITO"), which was doomed to failure when the United States
failed to ratify the ITO Charter. See id. William Diebold, Reflections on the International
Trade Organization, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 335, 339 (1994) (attributing the failure of the
ITO largely to protectionist pressures and a lack of business support); see generally Sey-
mour J. Rubin, The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade Organization, 63
HARv. L. REV. 78 (1949);John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International
Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570
(1984). During the early GATT years, the United States frequently used the dispute
settlement mechanism, more than any other party. Dunoff, supra note 321, at 12. This
use can be explained by the United States' relative power and the GATT membership,
which consisted of a small number of "[11 ike-minded states ...." Id. at 13.
327. Dunoff, supra note 321, at 15. During the 1960s, the membership of the
GATT changed dramatically. The European Community emerged as a new "muscular
superpower." Id. at 14. (quoting ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAw: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 12 (1993)).
328. The U.S. response to China's emergence as an international force has
spanned the gambit from adversary-following the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Em-
bassy in Belgrade and the 2001 spy-plane incident on Hainan Island-to a partner in
the war on terror and the Six-Party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. U.S. De-
partment of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, China, http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2008). Following the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the natural focus of the administration and Congress shifted from
addressing and managing issues with the key powers to combating terrorism. The ef-
fect on U.S. relations with China has been to promulgate a short-term, pragmatic strat-
egy dictated by international events and domestic political pressures. See Dunoff, supra
note 321, at 29 (discussing the United States' employment of the dispute settlement
system as a reflection of "[p]ragmatic Executive Branch decisions designed to deflect
protectionist pressures and silence Congressional critics.").
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and domestic realities, including the current international eco-
nomic climate, both the United States' and China's interna-
tional political positions, the current relationship between the
United States and China, and the domestic political and eco-
nomic environment of both countries.3 29 Thus, rather than fo-
cus solely on the United States' interests in isolation, the analysis
is specific to the U.S.-China relationship and its inherent dynam-
ics. 3 ° Looking more closely at the U.S.-China relationship may
thus help not only explain the WTO complaint, but may also
presage its possible outcome.
2. Domestic Industry Pressures
A recent task force created by the Council of Foreign Rela-
tions characterizes the sources of tension between the United
States and China as being four-fold: (1) China's rapid economic
development, (2) China's lagging political liberalization and re-
spect for human rights, (3) China's expanding economic and
political influence in the developing world, and (4) United
States' resources being diverted to combat terrorism.33 ' These
four areas form much of the underlying motivation for the
United States' complaint against China. Of these four areas,
though, China's rapid economic development predominates.
China's rapid economic development has proven to be both
problematic and lucrative for U.S. business interests. The sheer
population of China presents an unprecedented and untapped
market for American goods and services, including those central
329. See generally Jordan Brandt, Comparing Foreign Investment in China, Post-WTO
Accession, With Foreign Investment in the United States, Post-9/11, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & PoL'vJ.
285 (2007); Symposium, China and the WFO, 24 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89 (2007);
Eileen Francis Schneider, Note, Be Careful What You Wish For: China's Protectionist Regula-
tions of Foreign Direct Investment Implemented in the Months Before Completing WrO Accession,
2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 267 (2007).
330. The broader U.S.-China relationship has long involved a degree of nuance
and complexity, from the half century long dispute over the status of Taiwan, to con-
cerns over human rights and political freedoms, to the growing economic interdepen-
dence of the United States and Chinese markets. As China has emerged as an interna-
tional power, the relationship has grown increasingly more complicated. In the post-
Deng Xiaoping era, China's economy has grown at a rate of near to or exceeding
double-digits. China has reasserted itself as a major power in Asia, it continues to mod-
ernize its already numerically staggering military, and it has become an increasingly
important presence within international organizations. The United States and China
both have the potential to exert immense political, economic and military power at the
regional and global level.
331. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 320, at 6-7.
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in the intellectual property debate such as software, music, and
films.33 2 Here, the analysis dovetails with Dunoff's claim that the
ability of domestic constituencies, including intellectual prop-
erty users, to influence or compel state action affects United
States' action.333 Indeed, within the United States, unions, cor-
porate groups, and industry groups carry extensive lobbying
power over the executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment.33 4 For example, in a statement to the Committee on
House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, Thea M. Lee,
Policy Director of the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"), impressed upon
Congress the need to take immediate action against China. Spe-
cifically, in supporting a bill relating to currency valuation, Lee
stated:
Currency manipulation is an urgent economic issue for
American workers and businesses. We all live and work and
compete in the global economy-but in order to succeed in
the global economy, we need our own government to ensure
that the terms of competition are fair. Defining-and ade-
332. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property
in Post-WFO China, 55 Am. U.L. REv. 901, 929-30 (2006) (noting that American compa-
nies have to compete with both local companies and other foreign companies that are
"[r]ushing to the Chinese market because of 'China fever."' (citing HAROLD CHEE &
CHRIS WEST, MYrHs ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 30 (2004)).
333. Professor Dunoff argues that "[m] any U.S. cases involve something of a 'part-
nership' with interested private actors, who provide organization, financial, political
and informational resources to the USTR." Dunoff, supra note 321, at 26. Domestic
industry groups long pressured the USTR to initiate a WTO complaint against China.
In response, the USTR pursued bilateral negotiations, usually backed by Section 301
threats, rather than bring the complaint. In 2005, industry groups again requested the
USTR to bring a complaint. The USTR declined, however, noting that the industry
"had not presented the kind of specific information that would be required to success-
fully pursue a WTO complaint." Abbott, Law and Its Limitations, supra note 144, at 67.
334. Not all businesses are ready to criticize China. Some businesses operating in
China out of fear of loss of business have been reluctant to provide information to the
U.S. government to bring a case before the WITO. Support from U.S. businesses for
IrTo action largely depends upon whether the business is operating in China. Many
businesses that operate within China counsel against TI'O action. See, e.g., TheEnd of the
Beginning, supra note 148. Part of the reluctance stems from possible recriminations
and retaliation from the Chinese government, which might hurt U.S. businesses in
China. Businesses are acutely aware that they are subject to Chinese regulation and
that Chinese authorities can immediately negatively impact their business, for example,
by shutting it down. As such, multinational corporations operating in China "have
adopted a cooperative non-confrontational strategy that seeks to educate China that
protecting intellectual property rights are in China's own long-term best interests."
CHOW & LEE, supra note 5, at 790.
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quately addressing-currency manipulation is an essential el-
ement of ensuring fair global competition, but the institu-
tions of the global economy and our own government have so
far failed to rise to this challenge.
So many promises, so few results.
The Bush administration has refused to hold the Chinese gov-
ernment to its international obligations on trade, currency
manipulation and human rights, and has denied American
businesses import relief they are entitled to under the law
The AFL-CIO believes that the Bush Administration needs to
move beyond "bilateral consultation" and continued dialogue
to address the urgent problems in the U.S.-China and U.S.-
Japan trade and economic relationships.
First, the Administration should use the annual Treasury De-
partment exercise to send a clear and consistent message to
the governments of both China and Japan that they have
been identified as currency manipulators and that concrete
actions will follow if needed adjustments are not made in a
timely fashion.
Second, the Administration should signal that it will initiate
WTO dispute resolution with respect to ongoing currency
manipulation.
But Congress cannot wait for this Administration to act.
We urge Congress to give immediate consideration to the
Fair Currency Act of 2007, H.R. 782. 5
Of course, the industries most related to intellectual prop-
erty rights have been vocal in their attacks against China. The
movie industry, for example, has constantly criticized China for
its lack of enforcement and has also criticized the U.S. Adminis-
tration for not enforcing intellectual property protection com-
mitments obtained in trade agreements.3 3 6 Dan Glickman,
Chairman and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of
America, has criticized the Administration, complaining that
335. Hearing Before the Subcommittee of Trade of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Thea Lee, Policy Director, American Federa-
tion of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO")).
336. See generally Andrew Noyes, Intellectual Property; Web Piracy Called a Dagger in
Movie Industry's Heart, TECHNOLOGY DArLY, June 12, 2007.
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"trade agreements 'do no good if we cannot enforce them"' and
also criticized the Bush Administration for spending "more time
working on new deals than enforcing those already in place.
33 7
According to Glickman, China, as the worst infringer of U.S.
IPRs, "can and should show the world that it intends to play by
the rules [because] the whole world is watching," a reference to
the 2008 Beijing Olympics. " 's Other businesses echo these
cries. 339
3. Congressional Pressure
So too has Congress been vocal in its recriminations against
China. This involves more than intellectual property rights viola-
tions, and includes a wide range of economic and security is-
sues.3 4 ° Much of Congress's ire has been focused on the trade
imbalance with the underlying loss of American jobs and re-
duced wages.314' The U.S. trade deficit with China reached a
high of US$232.5 billion in 2006.42 It is of no small moment
337. See Sen. Finance, Trade Enforcement, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, June 12, 2007
(Testimony by Dan Glickman, MPAA Chair & CEO).
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Mark Kleinman, Chasing Copycats in a Tiger Economy Western Firms Fight
an Increasingly Fraught Battle to Protect their Names in China, THE DAiLY TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
June 9, 2007, at City 30. ("Inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in China
costs U.S. firms and workers billions of dollars each year, and in the case of many prod-
ucts, it also poses a serious risk of harm to consumers in China, the U.S. and around the
world."); see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 320, at 57-58 (2007); Tai-
Heng Cheng, Power, Norms, and International Intellectual Property Law, 28 Mich.J. Int'l L.
109, 150-53 (2006) (describing the impact of Chinese piracy of U.S. intellectual prop-
erty and the response of the U.S. aerospace industry to potential sanctions against
China levied by the United States).
340. See U.S. Interests in the Reform of China's Financial Services Sector: Hearing of the H.
Fin. Serv. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank) (recognizing
the concern of Americans and noted that the Chinese economic market is open only
for those areas in which China dominates. "The Chinese should understand that until
and unless they do a better job of practicing in China what they preach within the
United States, namely, openness in terms of your economy even when another econ-
omy might outperform you, they will continue to run into resistance.").
341. See Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues, TABLE CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE (CRS) REPORTS AND ISSUE BRIEFS, H.R. Doc, No. 275,1958, S.571 (2007)
("The Bush Administration has come under increasing pressure from Congress to take
a more aggressive stance against various Chinese economic and trade practices. Nu-
merous bills introduced in Congress look to restrict or punish China for these practices,
either directly, such as a proposal to remove permanent normal trade relations status,
or indirectly, such as placing restrictions on U.S. companies dealing with countries that
restrict Internet access.").
342. See The End of the Beginning, supra note 148 (explaining that the United States
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that the United States' WTO complaint was filed shortly after
Democratic Party leaders called upon President Bush to gener-
ate a comprehensive plan to eliminate the rising deficit with
China. 43 At the same time, the Administration was engaged in
intensive negotiations with Congress regarding the approval of
recent trade agreements (signed with Columbia, Peru, and Pan-
ama) and extending the Administration's trade promotion au-
thority.344 Tied closely to the trade imbalance is the valuation of
China's currency, and the perception that China has intention-
ally maintained an overvalued Yuan to promote its own ex-
ports. 45 This again is consistent with Professor Dunoff's claim
that the timing of the United States' complaints "reflects the his-
toric American pattern of initiating disputes when the country is
facing negative trade balances, rising protectionist voices at
home, or when the Administration is about to seek new trade
negotiation authority from the Congress. "346
Congress has not limited itself to rhetorical attacks against
China; rather, Congress has also introduced substantial legisla-
tion to exert pressure on both the Executive Branch and, ulti-
mately, on China. Such legislation includes: (1) a bill that
threatens China with sanctions if it does not revalue its currency
(providing that a country that engages in exchange rate mis-
alignment can be subject to a countervailing export subsidy); 347
(2) a bill seeking to establish a "trade prosecutor;"34 and (3) a
bill to "improve the management, coordination and effective-
has posted a trade deficit since the 1970s, and it has been rapidly increasing since 1997.
The U.S. trade deficit hit a record high of US$763.6 billion in 2006, up from US$716.7
billion in 2005); see also ANIL HiRA & RON HiP.A, OUTSOURCING AMERICA: WHAT'S BE-
HIND OUR NATIONAL CRISIS AND How WE CAN RECLAIM AMERICAN JOBS 36-38 (2005).
Scholars such as Paul Craig Roberts, Paul Samuelson, and Lou Dobbs have expressed
concerns over outsourcing, predicting trade deficit. Id.
343. See Dunoff, supra note 321, at 28 (citing G. Yerkey, Democrats call on Bush to
Craft Plan to Eliminate Trade Deficits with "Big 3," WTO REPORTER (February 15, 2007)).
344. See id. at 29.
345. A close analogy may be drawn to similar congressional attacks against Japan
during its export-led development in the 1970s and 1980s.
346. Dunoff, supra note 321, at 28.
347. Trade Prosecutor Act, S.445, 110th Cong. (2007) (establishing the position of
Trade Enforcement Officer and a Trade Enforcement Division at the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative).
348. Intellectual Property Enforcement Act, S.522, 110th Cong. (2007) (improving
the management, coordination, and effectiveness of international intellectual property
enforcement).
2008]
184 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
ness of international intellectual property enforcement." 349 The
protectionist voices in Congress and in the private sector con-
cern others, such as Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, who
stated that those who believe in open economies are "swimming
against a strong protectionist tide" that reflects the view of "a
large section of the American public. ' 'b50 In short, protectionism
is the sentiment of the day.3 5 1
The problem, of course, is that protectionism is not a grow-
ing force only in the United States. Protectionism begets protec-
tionism. 52 It is thus no surprise that it is playing a role in
China's domestic politics as well. China's custom regulations
and protection of domestic industries such as the telecommuni-
cations industry-where only six of 20,000 telecommunications
licenses had gone to foreigners353-have led the United States
and the European Union to complain about China's trade prac-
tices. While the United States has an impressive trade relation-
ship with China-a recent study by the Institute for Interna-
349. Fair Currency Act, S.796, I10th Cong. (2007) (providing that exchange rate
misalignment by any foreign nation is a countervailable export subsidy).
350. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury, Remark at the
Heritage Foundation Lee Lecture: China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue (June
5, 2007).
351. Congress' actions are likely politically motivated. For one, it could be argued
that the United States is using the WTO dispute settlement system to forestall protec-
tionist measures in Congress. The administration has been under increased pressure
from Congress. See generally Morrison, supra, note 341. Treasury Secretary Henry Paul-
son, Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, and Trade Rep. Susan Schwab have warned
that action taken by Congress to address the China problem "could potentially violate
our international obligations" and may lead to retaliation. See Jed Graham, Congress
Pushes Anti-China Legislation as Paulson Warns Bill Could Backfire, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS
DAILY, Aug. 2, 2007, at AO. Working through the WTO dispute settlement system may
be the only alternative to prevent Congress from taking more serious action, such as
raising tariffs. See generally Editorial, Strategic Economic Dialogue Stumbles, THE JAPAN
TIMES, May 28, 2007. Second, the 2008 election cycle starting as early as any cycle in
history, and economic issues forming the bedrock of most Congressional and Senatorial
campaigns. See Andrew Gumbel, Rivals Compete to Show Off Economic Nous, THE INDEPEN-
DENT (London),Jan. 24, 2008, at 32. Polls indicate that the economy is the number one
concern for voters, and "the deepening economic crisis will dominate everything be-
tween now and November." Id. As such, both political parties will be staking out posi-
tions supporting American economy and protecting American jobs from the actual or
perceived threats posed by China.
352. Historically, this in-kind response to protectionism goes back to the 1930
Smoot-Hawley legislation, when high tariffs in the United States was followed by in-
creased tariffs in eight countries, and a number of protectionist measures in other
countries. Dunoff, supra note 321, at 3.
353. Richard McGregor & Andrew Bounds, EU Trade Chief Warns China's Surplus is
'Unsustainable,' FIN. TIMEs (London), June 11, 2007, at 8.
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tional Economic and Center for Strategic and International
Studies found that the United States' economy was approxi-
mately US$70 billion richer as a result of trade with China, 354
China's trade relationship with the European Union is more im-
pressive and growing even faster, with bilateral trade growing by
twenty-nine percent in the last year (projected to exceed £170
billion by the end of 2007).5 It will thus be important for Eu-
rope to also exert pressure on China. Europe is currently taking
a wait-and-see approach.356
At bottom, the United States' IPR enforcement complaint
against China largely reflects the broader tensions within the
U.S.-China relationship. The current administration is under
significant Congressional pressure to maintain the United States'
position in the global economy, as well as its political clout.
Meanwhile, even though many U.S. businesses decry China's
lack of enforcement, others that have benefited from ongoing
reforms in China's economy are torn between potential loss of
business resulting from retaliatory Chinese state action and the
ongoing losses resulting from piracy. The breadth of issues im-
pacting the U.S.-China relationship suggests that the IPR issue
would best be resolved diplomatically, rather than through the
WTO dispute settlement process, particularly as these countries
are going to be repeat players in the contest for global power
and influence:
That this is not the case suggests that the United States may
simply have had little choice. The very detailed negotiations sur-
354. FRED BERGSTEN, BATES GILL, NICHOLAS R. LARDY, & DEREK MITCHELL, CHINA:
THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING
SUPERPOWER 10 (Inst. For Int'l Econ. & Ctr. For Strategic and Int'l Studies ed., Public
Affairs 2006).
355. See generally McGregor & Bounds, supra note 353. The European Union is
obviously concerned. See id. (warning that the European Union is growing impatient at
China's failure to "tame an export machine driven by a powerful combination of low
cost of capital, lax environmental and regulatory controls and a burgeoning en-
trepreneurial class, with greater freedom to do business offshore than ever before.").
European Union Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson has cautioned, "[i]f China
wants to keep our trade relationship on an even keel then it is going to have to
recognise the misgivings that exist in Europe about those policies which in our view
restrict European companies entering its market." Id.
356. See generally McGregor & Bounds, supra note 353.
357. Constant attacks being waged at the WTO may likely lead to a "breakdown in
cooperative behavior." This is especially so since both states enjoy comparable military
capabilities, with both countries enjoying nuclear capabilities and large economies. See
Nzelibe, supra note 54, at 11.
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rounding China's WTO accession, several agreements during
the 1990s, rampant piracy with no improvement despite continu-
ous promises, the enormous trade deficit, cries in Congress for
protectionist policy, and the possible damage to U.S. reputation
left the United States with no real alternative. Still, the United
States can use the WTO complaint to optimize its position across
this range of issues, obtaining concessions beyond WTO compli-
ance. 58 It has done this with a number of other WTO com-
plaints, which the United States filed but ultimately resolved
without a formal ruling.359 China's high visibility on the world
stage as a result of the 2008 Beijing Olympics also provided the
United States with the opportunity to take advantage of China's
relative vulnerability to international pressure.3 60 At any rate,
the complaint moves the United States and China to a new level
of potential conflict.
CONCLUSION
If the United States is successful in its complaint, China
would be required to lower thresholds for criminal penalties.
This does not ensure a corresponding rise in criminal prosecu-
tions or, for that matter, a reduction in infringement. However,
the complaint is important in a number of respects. First, by
filing the complaint, the United States is demonstrating its will-
ingness to pursue WTO actions against China for intellectual
property rights violations. This signals that future WTO actions
are imminent if China does not honor its commitments. Sec-
ond, the current WTO complaint can be seen as an intermediary
step in the United States' effort to have China improve IPRs en-
forcement. In its 2006 Top to Bottom Review of U.S.-China
Trade Relations, the USTR identified three phases in its trade
relations with China. Phase One consisted of the fifteen-year pe-
riod from 1986-2001. During that period, the United States'
358. See generally Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Imple-
ment World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 Am. U.
INT'L L. REv. 399 (2002).
359. See, e.g., Mutually Agreed Solution, China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Cir-
cuits, V'J/DS309/8 (Oct. 5, 2005); Mutually Agreed Solution China-Measures Granting
Refunds, Reductions, or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, WT/DS358/14 (Jan. 4,
2008).
360. Dunoff, supra note 314, at 29 (citing H. Cooper, Darfur Collides with Olympics,
and China Yields, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007, at Al).
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trade policy was principally focused on "negotiating founda-
tional trade agreements with China necessary to bring China
into the rules-based world trading system." '' This phase ended
with China acceding to the WTO. During this time, the United
States' trade with China increased from US$8 billion to US$121
billion, moving China from the eighteenth U.S. trading partner
to the fourth.36 2 During the second phase, from 2001 to 2005,
the principal focus of U.S. trade policy towards China was "to
monitor China's integration into the global trading system and
ensure compliance with its accession obligations. '363 The cur-
rent phase, 2006-forward, seeks a "more equitable and durable"
trade relationship with China, focusing on growth of U.S. ex-
ports, and also on ensuring full compliance with China's interna-
tional obligations, including the more difficult obligations. 64
Seen in this light, the United States has moved beyond monitor-
ing China's global trade integration and into a more active role
in ensuring full compliance. The complaint may be one of a
series of complaints that steadily make certain that China is fully
implementing its obligations. One such future action could be
related to enforcement of existing laws rather than on enacting
additional legislation.
More likely, however, is that the complaint will result in very
little substantive intellectual property changes. The United
States may prevail on some of its claims, but China should be
able to successfully defend on the primary claim. The conse-
quence is that the complaint may further damage the relation-
ship between the United States and China. The potential gains
must come from other non-IP areas such as correcting the cur-
rency valuation and reducing the trade deficit. Whether the po-
tential gains will outweigh the potential damage is the ultimate
question. The answer remains to be seen.
361. USTR, supra note 76, at 8.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 9.
364. Id. at 10-11.
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